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in readiness and thus is capable of conducting an array of military operations in austere 
locations. In recent years, the U.S. Marine Corps has employed the Expeditionary 
Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept to host, secure, sustain, and maintain 
warriors and their weapons systems on a more amorphous and difficult-to-target 
forward-basing infrastructure. The problem is the logistics and operational contract 
support (OCS) requirements that will be needed to optimize EABO and sustain 
expeditionary advanced bases in austere locations against a pacing threat have not 
been identified. The purpose of this project is to develop a model that provides insight 
into the synchronization and optimization of estimated logistics support timelines with 
those of III Marine Expeditionary Force operational contract support timelines to better 
optimize the U.S. Marine Corps EABO concept so the warfighter receives supplies 
and services at—or near—the time when doctrinal days of self-sustainment are due to 
expire. To this avail, this project provides an abbreviated and foundational 
understanding of the current Marine Corps organizational structure, an understanding of 
the Marine Littoral Regiment concept and the notional operational phases of 
military operations, and a working understanding of EABO and current III Marine 
Expeditionary Force OCS. 
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This chapter begins with an overview of the research to be conducted, then it 
follows with a discussion on the purpose of the report, and finally this chapter closes with 
a discussion of the determined scope of research. In the overview, a brief introduction to 
the Marine Corps is presented, as well as the problem being faced by today’s U.S. Marine 
Corps. Next, this chapter covers the purpose of this report and presents one primary 
question to be addressed, followed by two secondary questions. Last, this chapter presents 
the intended scope of this research report. Ultimately, this information provides context 
and situational awareness and helps frame the remainder of the research report. 
A. OVERVIEW 
The U.S. Marine Corps has been the nation’s first line of defense since 1775 
(Marines, 2020). Organized as an expeditionary force in readiness, the U.S. Marine Corps 
is enabled to deliver an unparalleled level of versatility, flexibility, expandability, rapid 
deployability, and sustainability for military operations (U.S. Marine Corps [USMC], 
2019, p. 1-1). Moreover, the nation’s premier fighting force is scalable, tailorable, self-
supported, self-contained, and combat-ready to conduct operations across a range of 
military operations. These unique capabilities are derived from the U.S. Marine Corps’ 
Marine Air–Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept of force employment. 
The scalable nature of the U.S. Marine Corps is supported by and derived from its 
ability to deploy task-organized forces that are trained, equipped, and specifically 
organized to support their assigned mission or intended purpose (i.e., a MAGTF). For large 
scale responses or major theater wars, the U.S. Marine Corps can deploy as a Marine 
expeditionary force (MEF). This force brings with it a command element (CE), a Marine 
division, a Marine air wing, and a Marine logistics group and is purpose-driven to win the 
nation’s heaviest battles. For smaller scale contingencies, the U.S. Marine Corps can 
deploy as a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). This force brings with it the same 
elements as a MEF; however, their force size is drastically reduced and the primary purpose 
of this type of organization is to respond to crisis. To promote peace and stability abroad, 
 2 
the U.S. Marine Corps can deploy as a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU). Like the MEF 
and the MEB, the MEU is task-organized with a division, an airwing, and logistics 
elements; however, the size of the MEU is much smaller than that of a MEB or a MEF. 
Last, the U.S. Marine Corps could deploy as a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF). 
SPMAGTFs are designed with a specific mission in mind; however, they are typically 
established to support humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) requirements. 
The tailorable nature of the U.S. Marine Corps is embedded within every MAGTF. 
This is because each comes with a CE, a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat 
element (ACE), and a logistics combat element (LCE). The CE possesses headquarters 
assets capable of providing command and control (C2), direction, planning, and 
coordination. The GCE brings with it an infantry unit augmented with reinforcements from 
artillery, reconnaissance, engineering, light armored reconnaissance, and various 
amphibious assault units. The ACE delivers air superiority in the form of combat assault 
support and air mobility in the form of combat assault transport and requisite aviation 
logistics assets. Last, the LCE provides the necessary logistics assets and forces to conduct 
all functions of logistics. As a MAGTF, all of these elements are combined and task-
organized to accomplish an assigned mission. Through the effective and efficient 
deployment of each element’s unique capability, combatant commanders have 
considerable leeway on how to properly tailor the force to optimize force employment. 
The self-supported nature of the U.S. Marine Corps is derived from every MAGTF 
possessing an LCE that brings with its essential combat service support (CSS) capabilities. 
Each CSS is capable of performing all functions of logistics—engineering, supply, 
services, transportation, medical/dental, and maintenance. Since the U.S. Marine Corps 
brings with it its own capabilities, it is completely self-supported and only needs to rely on 
other services or joint forces when absolutely necessary to accomplish an assigned mission. 
The self-contained nature of the U.S. Marine Corps is derived from the MAGTF’s 
organizational structure itself. This is because each MAGTF, from a MEF all the way down 
to a SPMAGTF, is organized with a command asset, infantry assets, air assets, and logistics 
assets. Since the U.S. Marine Corps deploys with everything needed to support an assigned 
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mission—forces, ammunition, food, water, and so on—it is capable of executing operations 
without reliance on other services or joint forces. 
The combat-ready nature of the U.S. Marine Corps is derived from the Marine 
division’s mission to be able to provide a ground amphibious forcible-entry capability and 
the GCE’s unique ability to provide self-supporting combat power and abilities for 
amphibious assaults and other combat related operations. Only when absolutely necessary 
does the GCE require support from the logistical and CSS elements of the U.S. Marine 
Corps. 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Marine Corps, as a force in readiness, is not designed or 
equipped to deter potential adversaries in austere locations (Berger, 2019a, p. 1). Moreover, 
the defining attributes of the current premier fighting force are no longer what the nation 
requires of its Marine Corps (Berger, 2020, p. 2). Given that mobility inside an adversarial 
weapons engagement zone (WEZ) will dictate a nation’s competitive advantage in the 
global domain and is an operational imperative (Berger, 2020, p. 5), the commandant of 
the Marine Corps (CMC) has placed III MEF at the tip of the spear as the U.S. Marine 
Corps’ main focus-of-effort to create mutually contested maritime space and to facilitate 
larger naval campaigns (Berger, 2019a, p. 3). 
Although the U.S. Marine Corps is poised as an expeditionary force in readiness, 
to remain globally competitive and able to deter or prevent aggression from pacing threats, 
the U.S. Marine Corps must seek innovative solutions. A good example of this innovation 
is the expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO) concept. The EABO concept 
focuses on two primary assumptions:  
1. Force resiliency, to persist and operate within range of adversary precision 
long-range fires, is a fundamental operational assumption; and  
2. A portion of naval forces must be regionally aligned and focused on a 
specific threat (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Concepts & Plans 
Division [MCWL, C&P], 2018, p. 24).  
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By leveraging inner- and outer-force qualities and capabilities of EABO, the United 
States, its naval forces, and the U.S. Marine Corps will be poised to leverage advantages 
of mass and maneuver necessary to be decisive in battle (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 24). 
The central idea of EABO is that it “enables naval forces to persist and operate 
forward within range of adversary long-range precision fires, in order to contest, control or 
deny sea space” (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 25). Moreover, “expeditionary advanced bases 
(EABs) are designed to host, secure, sustain, and maintain warriors and their weapons 
systems on a more amorphous and difficult to target forward-basing infrastructure” 
(MCWL, C&P, 2018, pp. 25–26). Unfortunately, the logistical and operational contract 
support (OCS) requirements that will be needed to optimize EABO and sustain EABs in 
austere locations against a pacing threat have not been identified. 
B. PURPOSE 
This professional report serves multiple purposes. First, it lays out the current 
Marine Corps organizational structure. Second, it discusses the notional operational phases 
of military operations. Third, it provides a working understanding of EABOs. Fourth, it 
provides a summary view of Marine Corps III MEF OCS. Fifth, it attempts to succinctly 
develop a model that ties together an estimated logistics support timeline (eLST) with a 
contract support timeline (CST) based on all of the previously discussed purposes. 
Ultimately, this professional report provides insight via modeling and simulation to inform 
EABO–OCS decision-making regarding III MEF OCS processes and contracting officer 
capacity, given future force design and Marine Corps planning guidance. 
The primary purpose of this research is to answer the question of whether the 
current III MEF CST is synchronized with an eLST to support Marine Corps EABO–OCS, 
given the demands of future force designs and Marine Corps planning guidance. This 
research question is very broad and difficult to answer, therefore, the following list of 
secondary questions will govern research and be used to further refine the purpose of this 
project: 
1. What estimated logistics support timeline elements facilitate or inhibit III MEF 
contracting support beyond the micro-purchase threshold? 
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2. What contract support timeline elements facilitate or inhibit III MEF contracting 
support beyond the micro-purchase threshold? 
Research for this project started with a review of joint, U.S. Marine Corps, and 
Navy doctrinal publications. In addition, several past theses and MBA projects similar in 
concept were reviewed, which provided insight into the methodology of conducting similar 
operations. An extensive review of the NPS theses archive was conducted; however, 
considering that the employment of EABO is a nascent concept, little doctrinal writing has 
occurred over the past few years, especially when it comes to logistical support and OCS. 
A certain goal of this research is to fill a gap of information that exists on how the Marine 
Corps conducts and sustains EABO from a combined organic and nonorganic perspective, 
such that the two are mutually supportive. Moreover, an additional goal of this research is 
to provide a scenario-based model that can be tailored by capacity (primarily personnel and 
time) and then run through simulations to identify levels of convergence or divergence 
between eLSTs and III MEF CSTs when it comes to achieving a specific mission. 
The ultimate purpose of this project is to gain a better understanding of how the 
Marine Corps can leverage the III MEF CST, such that the III MEF CST and eLSTs are 
optimally synchronized to increase the combat effectiveness of EABO. To do so, the III 
MEF CST is modeled in Arena modeling software. Next, this model incorporates an eLST. 
The eLST acts as a vital reference point (in the form of a range of days) for which 
contracted support will need to be available when it comes to mission execution. 
The analysis and aggregation of this information is used to develop a 
comprehensive—albeit very basic—logistics and contract support model that can then be 
optimized to enhance OCS. Moreover, from this analysis, modeling, and simulation, 
recommendations for improvements to current contract support practices and future 
contract support practices are presented. Finally, additional research requirements are 
highlighted for future research efforts to address. These recommended future research 




The U.S. Marine Corps is the U.S. premier expeditionary force in readiness and is 
capable of conducting an array of military operations in austere locations through the 
employment of forces via the EABO concept. The problem is that the Marine Corps may 
not possess the additional and necessary structure required to execute EABO in contested 
littoral environments against a pacing threat (Berger, 2020, p. 10). This is because the 
Marine Corps currently deploys forces using a legacy system of fixed infrastructure and 
outdated assumptions of likely sea and air control requirements to defend and support 
forces that are forward deployed. Moreover, the use of legacy systems and infrastructure 
generates operational vulnerabilities and increased risk aversion when facing off with a 
pacing threat. According to the EABO Handbook (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 23), the use of 
legacy infrastructure, the generation of new requirements for force resiliency, and the 
needed ability to operate within the range of pacing threats weapons creates 
disproportionate risk to both the mission and the force when facing off with a peer 
competitor. Moreover, according to General Berger (2019a, p. 2), in order to facilitate 
larger naval campaigns and to enable desired levels of sea control or denial, the Marine 
Corps must integrate new approaches to operations in the maritime domain. As initiatives 
move beyond concept to implementation, the CMC plans to leverage EABO to complement 
naval expeditionary warfare and to prepare for missions against peer adversaries (Berger, 
2019a, p. 11). 
There are significant advantages to be gained by developing and accelerating 
EABO capabilities. However, to date, the Marine Corps has conducted minimal OCS 
wargaming efforts for the purpose of better analyzing, understanding, and informing 
EABO decision-making, especially with regard to OCS and logistical requirements. 
Considering that the current Marine Corps force design is optimized for large-scale 
amphibious forcible entry and sustained operations, and the EABO concept requires the 
employment of two distinct force postures—an inside force and an outside force—much 
consideration with regard to OCS and logistical requirements must be given. 
The large number and complexity of the types of operations likely to be conducted 
under EABO preclude the study and inclusion of all scenarios or applications within this 
 7 
research project. The primary focus within this project will be on the inside force of EABO. 
The inside force has been chosen because it is the tactical element of EABO that will be 
operating within the range of adversary long-range precision fires that will be required to 
maneuver massed capabilities forward for decisive engagements. The qualities and 
capabilities of the inside force are only fully realized when the Marine Corps optimizes an 
EAB’s ability to conduct reconnaissance activities, as well as low-signature capabilities 
using a “more amorphous, distributed, and hard-to-target infrastructure” (MCWL, C&P, 
2018, p. 24). 
Not only will EABO demand optimized expeditionary advanced basing facilities, 
it will also demand seamless naval integration. The CMC has stated the future naval force 
will be purpose built and optimized for naval expeditionary warfare (Berger, 2019a, p. 5). 
Since naval integration will be vital to EABO success, the scope of this research will be 
limited to methods of employment that heavily leverage naval capabilities. 
The pacing threat is becoming increasingly more disruptive and unsettling. With 
growing inventories of precision strike short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), adversaries 
will be able to strike EABs within a WEZ despite the EABs’ dispersion and small footprints 
(Schiff, 2020, p. 74). This places significant risk on Marines deployed in future operations 
against a pacing threat. In addition, it places increased demand on OCS and logistical 
requirements to ensure that the Marines operating within these contested environments do 
not become liabilities or get cut off from vital resources needed to sustain operations. 
According to the CMC, logistics is both a critical requirement and a critical vulnerability 
(Berger, 2020, pp. 5–6). Considering that forces rely on logistics and OCS for survivability 
and that the threat to strike on EABs within a WEZ is increasing, the scope of this research 
is limited to those areas of responsibility (AORs) that are perceived to be most at risk (i.e., 
III MEF). 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a broad overview of the purpose and scope of this research 
project. The project provides an abbreviated and foundational understanding of the current 
Marine Corps organizational structure, the notional operational phases of military 
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operations, and a working understanding of EABO and III MEF OCS. Finally, this project 
attempts to combine all of the previously discussed purposes to develop a model in attempts 
to synchronize an eLST with the III MEF CST to enhance EABO. Moreover, this model is 
then used to simulate changes in CST elements (personnel and time) to identify possible 
changes in current operations necessary to optimize and synchronize logistics and contract 
support timelines. The scope of this research was limited based on the capabilities and 
requirements of the EABO inner force, the demands for naval integration, and the 
survivability of Marine forces in the WEZs associated with III MEF. Moreover, the scope 
of this research was limited based on current III MEF CSTs and an eLST. Considerations 
were given to various methodologies of modeling and simulation available, and a broad 





This section begins with a short history of the Marine Corps and a discussion about 
the theory of constraints (TOC) and its applicability to supply chain optimization (with a 
focus on the Marine Corps); then the section delves into a thorough discussion of how the 
Marine Corps is currently task organized. Following these sections, the operational phases 
of every operation are discussed. EABO influences, mission types, and end-state are laid 
out. Finally, an overview of Marine Corps OCS is presented to the reader in order to 
establish a CST that will be used as a starting point in the development of a model that 
optimizes just-in-time nonorganic capabilities. By understanding these concepts, the reader 
is given context to the current operational situation and is informed why supply chain 
optimization and process improvement is critical to ongoing developments, especially 
when it comes to ensuring that nonorganic capabilities reach the operational environment 
at (or near) the execution of a mission. Last, this information helps the reader understand 
how the Marine Corps has organizationally fought wars in the past and how they plan to 
task-organize in order to fight future wars. Ultimately, this information provides context 
and situational awareness and helps build a foundation from which the reader will be able 
to better understand the model developed in this thesis. 
A. HISTORY 
Since the 1950s, the current Marine Corps force design has gone unchanged in its 
essential inspiration (Berger, 2020, p. 2). Although doctrine and technology have been 
created to support a force design that is optimized for large-scale amphibious forcible entry 
and sustained operations ashore, much still needs to be accomplished in order to create 
mutually contested maritime space and to facilitate larger naval campaigns. This is 
because, since 1995, the Marine Corps has been involved in more than 28 major military 
operations—each centered around sea-basing and the use of forward-deployed, combat-
ready naval forces. In the future fight against a pacing threat, sea-basing and the 
surrounding concepts might be but one method the Marine Corps can employ to achieve a 
competitive advantage against adversarial threats. 
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B. THEORY OF CONSTRAINTS  
The theory of constraints (TOC) can be viewed as a comprehensive model for 
overseeing an organization (Rahman, 1998) and achieving supply chain goals (Perez, 
1997). Moreover, the TOC recognizes the impact managerial policy has on organizational 
constraints and is formed from different links in the supply chain (Perez, 1997). By 
applying the TOC to organizational policies and procedures, organizations are better 
equipped to effectively process ongoing improvement, enhance supply chain performance, 
and optimize delivery, costs, and responsiveness (Perez, 1997). From a Marine Corps 
perspective, the TOC is important and relevant because nonfinancial competitive 
advantages (e.g., responsiveness, flexibility, adaptability, etc.) are becoming more 
important when it comes to dealing with pacing threats, especially if competition were to 
be handled in contested environments. For example, responsiveness, flexibility, throughput 
time, inventory turnover, and resource optimization will play a vital role in ensuring the 
organic capabilities of the Marine Corps are able to survive against adversarial threats in 
contested environments. 
In continuation, the TOC is a set of parametric policies and supply chain practices 
developed in the early 1980s (Perez, 1997). The premise behind the TOC is that every 
organization is only as strong as its weakest link (i.e., constraint) and that—if these 
constraints can be properly identified, safeguarded, and minimized—organizations can 
more effectively and efficiently optimize throughput, inventory, and operating expenses 
(Perez, 1997). According to Rahman (1998) and Goldratt & Cox (2012), the process of 
ongoing improvement focuses on five steps: identify system constraint(s), decide how to 
exploit system constraint(s), subordinate everything else to the specified exploitation, 
improve system constraint(s), and repeat to optimize constraint(s). By applying the TOC 
to Marine Corps operations, one can begin to realize and optimize the operational impact 
and survivability of forces operating in austere locations—even while being contested. 
1. Drum-Buffer-Rope 
Rahman (1998) described the drum-buffer-rope (DBR) as a material flow logistical 
system, wherein the drum represents the system schedule, the buffer consists of inventory 
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and parts—or time buffers (T-Bs) to protect against output variations—and the rope 
delivers synchronization through the establishment of critical lines of communication 
between control points. In an organization, the overall system schedule is synchronized 
and protected through the effective and efficient use of T-Bs and ropes. Furthermore, T-Bs 
serve as systems of information that successfully enhance and govern throughput. This is 
referred to as buffer management. In addition, T-Bs provide organizations with planned 
and actual performance-based information to efficiently monitor actual inventory 
throughput against planned performance to protect critical resources within the assembly 
line. Buffer management consists of three types of T-Bs: constraint buffers, assembly 
buffers, and shipping buffers. Constraint buffers are parts with specified lead times that are 
placed ahead of capacity constraint resources (CCRs) and serve to protect the constraint’s 
planned schedule. Moreover, assembly buffers are parts or subassemblies of CCRs. Last, 
shipping buffers are finished and ready-to-ship products that protect an organization’s 
delivery date performance. The purpose of these buffers is to assist with identifying various 
causes of interruptions without interrupting overall throughput. In addition, these buffers, 
if continually reduced, help reduce production cycle times and possibly lead times 
(Rahman, 1998). By identifying T-Bs within the Marine Corps operational timeline, one 
can begin to develop a model that optimizes the link between organic and nonorganic 
requirements so that they are efficiently and effectively helping the Marine Corps 
throughout any given operational environment and under any operational threat. 
2. TOC Application to SCM 
As previously mentioned, the TOC is a set of parametric policies and supply chain 
practices developed to address organizational weaknesses in the form of constraints; if 
these constraints are properly identified, safeguarded, and minimized, organizations can 
more effectively and efficiently optimize throughput, inventory, and operating expenses 
(Perez, 1997). Moreover, the TOC is built upon the process of ongoing improvement and 
can be used to better understand the impact of constraints on factory performance in 
relation to interlinked input from suppliers, customers, and laborers within the entire supply 
chain (Perez, 1997). Furthermore, organizational policies and procedures, effectively 
implemented through the process of ongoing improvement, lead to enhanced supply chain 
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performance and optimized delivery, cost, and responsiveness (Perez, 1997). By focusing 
on entire system management instead of subsystems isolation, the TOC and the process of 
ongoing improvement seek to improve organizational supply chain management as well as 
overall supply chain performance. Applying this thought to the Marine Corps, the TOC 
will help identify and mitigate risks between logistics support timelines (organic) and CSTs 
(nonorganic). Moreover, the TOC will help provide a basis from which a model to optimize 
the link between organic and nonorganic timelines can be achieved to the greatest extent 
possible. 
C. MARINE CORPS TASK ORGANIZATION 
The Marine Corps is designed and organized as a “conventional force in readiness” 
(USMC, 2019, p. 1-1). Through the use of Marine Corps forces, the president and the 
secretary of defense (SecDef) can leverage a combat-ready, combined-arms responsive 
force to deal with conflict across a spectrum of operational requirements. As the combat-
ready arm of the Department of the Navy (DON), the Marine Corps provides tailorable 
“self-contained and self-sustained air, land, and sea strike forces” that can be combined 
with sea-basing operations to meet any contingency or to respond to natural disasters or 
regional aggression (USMC, 1998, p. 1-1). These tailorable strike forces are formally 
known as Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). 
MAGTFs are the Marine Corps’ “principal organization for the conduct of all 
missions across the range of military operations” (USMC, 1998, p. 2-1). They consist of 
integrated, combined armed forces that provide combatant commanders or other 
operational commanders with flexible, task-organized response capabilities in support of 
contingency requirements anywhere in the world. Due to their versatility and 
organizational structure, MAGTFs have the capability to contribute as part of naval 
expeditionary forces, as well as the ability to conduct sustained operations ashore. 
Moreover, because of their innate ability to operate in permissive, uncertain, and hostile 
environments, MAGTFs are able to provide a highly visible presence in austere operating 
environments capable of projecting measurable combat power ashore. In addition, their 
 13 
austere and force projection capability allows them to secure staging areas ashore for 
follow-on forces. 
“MAGTFs deploy as amphibious, air-contingency, or maritime prepositioning 
forces (MPFs), either as part of a naval expeditionary force or via strategic lift” (USMC, 
1998, p. 2-1). MAGTFs can also be employed “as part of larger joint or combined forces” 
(USMC, 1998, p. 1-1). These forces deploy with everything necessary to accomplish 
assigned missions. When deployed with naval expeditionary forces, MAGTFs provide 
continuous presence at strategic locations and are readily available to rapidly deploy upon 
notification. Last, when conducting joint operations, the MAGTF composition provides the 
joint force commander (JFC) the capability to “regenerate, reorganize, replenish, and 
reorient itself for a new mission without having to return to a home base” (USMC, 1998, 
p. 2-1). 
Built on a foundation of six core competencies—expeditionary readiness, 
combined-arms operations, expeditionary operations, sea-based operations, forcible entry 
from the sea, and reserve integration—MAGTF operations have the competency to carry 
out a wide array of mission sets. Moreover, since MAGTFs are scalable, they also possess 
the ability to “project mobile, reinforceable, and sustainable combat power” across a wide 
spectrum of military operations (USMC, 2019, pp. 1–3). 
Although task organized and reliant upon six core competencies, each MAGTF 
(regardless of overall size) is comprised of the same structure and core elements—a CE, a 
GCE, an ACE, and an LCE. The CE acts as the MAGTF’s headquarters and provides the 
necessary staff and capabilities to enable C2 planning and execution of all operations. The 
GCE conducts ground operations to support the MAGTF mission and is customarily 
formed around an infantry organization reinforced by artillery, reconnaissance, armor, and 
engineer forces. The ACE performs the six functions of Marine aviation—offensive air 
support, anti-air warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and 
control of aircraft and missiles—in support of the MAGTF mission and is customarily 
formed around an aviation organization supplemented with air C2, air combat, and air CSS 
forces. Last, the LCE provides a full range of CSS functions and capabilities in support of 
continued readiness and sustainability of the MAGTF and is normally formed around a 
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logistics headquarters with support detachments that vary in size and are dependent upon 
the assigned mission. Figure 1 depicts the typical MAGTF organization (USMC, 2019). 
 
Figure 1. MAGTF Organization. Source: USMC (1998). 
The Marine Corps organizational structure can be employed at four individual 
levels of deployable MAGTF: the MEF, the MEB, the MEU, and the SPMAGTF. All of 
these units are founded on the standard MAGTF organizational structure; however, they 
differ when it comes to their concept of employment—size, deployment consideration, and 




Figure 2. MAGTF Key Elements. Source: USMC (2019). 
A MEF is the Marine Corps’ principal warfighting organization. It is capable of 
executing a wide array of military operations and when augmented appropriately, can act 
as a joint task force (JTF) headquarters. MEFs vary depending on mission requirements 
and typically deploy by echelon with up to 60 days of sustainment. Moreover, when 
properly supported with maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies, a MEF may 
conduct ongoing operations ashore following an amphibious operation (USMC, 2019, pp. 
1–3–1-4). 
Within the Marine Corps, there are three standing MEFs: I MEF, which is based 
primarily in southern California; II MEF, which is based primarily in North Carolina; and 
III MEF, which is primarily based in Okinawa, Japan. Each MEF consists of a “CE, one 
Marine Division (MARDIV), one Marine aircraft wing (MAW), and one Marine logistics 
group (MLG)” (USMC, 2019, p. 1-3). When building combat capabilities, the elements of 
a MEF act as reservoirs from which MAGTFs are designed and developed.  
MEBs act as subordinate commands of the MEF and are intended to accomplish 
operational missions based on augmentation. MEBs are midsize MAGTFs designed to 
conduct or respond to major security operations, large crises or contingencies, or major 
campaigns. Moreover, MEBs deploy with up to 30 days of sustainability, and they are 
oriented around a respective AOR. MEBs provide, at the guidance of a general officer, a 
foundation for forcible entry and other power projection operations. For example, a MEB 
can contain the landing forces necessary to conduct amphibious landings, or they can 
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contain fly-in echelons that meet up with MPF equipment and supplies. Moreover, all 
MEBs are expeditionary forces capable of rapid deployment and employment. Their 
expeditionary nature comes from their ability to leverage amphibious ships, strategic lift, 
and MPF assets to deploy. Last, there are three regionally oriented MEBs: 1st MEB, which 
is aligned to I MEF; 2nd MEB, which is aligned to II MEF, and 3rd MEB, which is aligned 
to III MEF. Their regional focus enables the extension of a MEF into forward domains, 
and their expeditious nature enables them to bridge potential gaps during crisis response 
(USMC, 2019). 
As a standard forward-deployed expeditionary organization, a MEU is capable of 
conducting missions of narrow scope and duration as an extension of the MEF. MEUs act 
as a forward-deployed, sea-based, rapid crisis response capability that the president, 
SecDef, or combatant commanders can call on to conduct a full range of military 
operations—maritime reconnaissance, surveillance, tactical recovery of aircraft and 
personnel (TRAP), and search and seizure of vessels. Moreover, a MEU can act as an 
enabler for larger follow-on forces, and they can provide a visible and credible presence 
due to their unique deployment capabilities. MEUs undergo intensive 26-week, 
standardized pre-deployment training programs intended to enable them to deploy within 
a 6-hour notification under a wide range of mission requirements (USMC, 2019). 
SPMAGTFs are MAGTFs designed to conduct a specific mission. SPMAGTFs are 
not restricted to size; however, they are normally smaller than a MEU and may be task-
organized from MEF assets or formed for a contingency purpose. The mission of 
SPMAGTFs are performed independently from an already deployed MAGTF and are 
limited in scope and duration. Their missions typically include crisis response, regionally 
focused training exercises, and peacetime missions. SPMAGTFs are generally employed 
in a similar manner as a MEU; however, due to the nature of their mission, they may be 
deployed via other methods and modes of transportation—commercial shipping craft, 
inter-theater airlift, and organic Marine aviation assets (USMC, 2019). 
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1. Marine Logistics Group 
A Marine Logistics Group (MLG) is task-organized within every MEF and acts as 
a permanently structured command. The MLG provides direct support to Marine divisions 
and sustained tactical logistics to support each element of the MEF beyond a supported 
unit’s organic capability (USMC, 2019, p. 7-2). More specifically, an MLG provides 
logistic services related to maintenance, supply, transportation, general engineering, 
explosive ordnance disposal, health services, and messing (USMC, 2019, p. 7-2). Figure 3 
represents a notional command structure for 3rd Marine Logistics Group (3d MLG). 
 
Figure 3. MLG Notional Task Organization. Source: USMC (2019). 
2. Combat Logistics Regiment 
A Combat Logistics Regiment (CLR) is task-organized within every MLG and acts 
as a permanently structured command that forms the LCE within the MLG. A CLR, as the 
LCE headquarters for a MEB-sized MAGTF, provides direct tactical logistics to the Marine 
infantry division outside its organic capability. More specifically, the CLR provides 
terminal operations, medium- and heavy-lift transportation support, and landing support to 
the MEF and smaller MAGTFs within the MEF (USMC, 2019, p. 7-8). Figure 3 represents 
a notional command structure for a CLR. 
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3. Combat Logistics Battalion  
Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) is task-organized within every CLR and acts as 
a permanently structured command that forms the LCE within the CLB. The overarching 
mission of the CLB is to deliver general and sustained tactical-level logistic support outside 
a unit’s organic supply and maintenance capabilities (USMC, 2019, p. 7-7). More 
specifically, a CLB contains the necessary organizational and intermediate-level supply 
and maintenance, medical, motor transport, landing support, and other necessary CSS 
capabilities that their supported unit does not organically possess (USMC, 2019, p. 3-3). 
Figure 4 represents a notional command structure for CLB-15 and serves as a model for a 
traditional CLB. 
 
Figure 4. CLB-15 Task Organization. Source: CLB-15 (2020). 
4. Marine Littoral Regiment  
The Marine littoral regiment (MLR) maneuvers and persists inside a contested 
maritime environment and conducts sea denial operations as part of the naval expeditionary 
force (NEF) in order to enable fleet operations. An MLR may be assigned one of the 
following Marine Corps tasks (MCTs): 
• Conduct EABO 
• Command and control distributed forces 
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• Support maritime domain awareness 
• Support anti-surface warfare 
• Support anti-air warfare 
• Plan and direct shore-based tactical logistics 
• Conduct fires 
• Support operations in the information environment 
• Maneuver and persist in key maritime terrain 
In order for the MLR to persist inside the WEZ, the MLR must be able to deny the 
enemy’s use of key maritime terrain; degrade the enemy’s ability to perform its mission; 
enable fleet operations through EABO; rapidly deploy and employ forces (e.g., transition 
or shift from contact to blunt); maintain a high degree of mobility inside key maritime 
terrain; sustain forces with light, austere, efficient, and self-sufficient forces adept in local 
foraging; and protect forces by avoiding detection and targeting—all while securing sites 
and interior lines of communication. Figure 5 represents a notional table of organization 
for an MLR. 
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Figure 5. MLR Table of Organization Overview. Source: W. M. Young, 
personal communication, July 1, 2020.1 
5. Marine Littoral Regiment–Combat Logistics Battalion  
The Marine littoral regiment–combat logistics battalion (MLR–CLB) provides 
tactical logistics support to the MLR beyond organic capabilities by supporting EABs, 
managing cache sites, and connecting to operational logistics. Unique aspects of the MLR–
CLR configuration, not common to traditional CLR–CLBs, is the imbedded contracting 
officer (KO), disbursing agent, and field ordering officers (FOOs). Figure 6 represents a 
notional table of organization for an MLR–CLB. 
 
1 This information was communicated via a PowerPoint presentation attached to a personal email on 
July 1, 2020 
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Figure 6. MLR–CLB Notional Task Organization. Source: W. M. Young, 
personal communication, July 1, 2020.2 
D. OPERATIONAL PHASES 
Phases are distinct in “time, space, and purpose from one another;” however, they 
should be mutually supportive and represent a “natural progression and subdivision of the 
campaign” (JCS, 2017, p. xxiii). Moreover, the ending of one phase indicates the starting 
of the next one. However, on occasion operations may revert to a previous phase wherein 
a resurgence exists, or the enemy has reengaged with friendly forces. There are six phases 
in total along the continuum of military operations according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS, 2017) Joint Publication (JP) 5–10, titled Joint Planning. Figure 7 depicts the six 
notional operational phases of military operations. 
 
2 This information was communicated via a PowerPoint presentation attached to a personal email on 
July 1, 2020 
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Figure 7. Notional Operation Plan Phases. Source: JCS (2017). 
Phase 0: Shape the environment. Activities during this phase are focused around 
conducting ongoing and routine actions to ensure or solidify friendly and alliance 
relationships. When necessary, this phase relies on joint, interagency and multinational 
partnerships to deter potential adversaries. 
Phase 1: Deter the enemy. This phase builds upon Phase 0 and focuses on deterring 
specific adversaries by demonstrating force capabilities or executing show of force 
initiatives. The primary purpose of this phase is to pursue U.S. interests and to facilitate 
the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces in a given region. 
Phase 2: Seize the initiative. Hostilities are expected to commence during this 
phase. During this phase, adversaries are engaged through the use of combat power to 
delay, halt, or dislodge enemy actions as well as to gain freedom of action or access to 
critical infrastructure. Last, during this phase, activities are conducted to relieve crisis 
conditions and to promote regional stability. 
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Phase 3: Dominate the enemy. All attempts to break the adversary’s will for 
organized resistance is the primary focus of this phase. Combat power is leveraged to 
exploit, pursue, and destroy enemy resistance. Moreover, friendly forces begin to conduct 
and transition to stability operations during this phase. 
Phase 4: Stabilize the environment. Stability operations take center stage during 
this phase. Activities include reconstitution of infrastructure and the restoration of services. 
Last, the transfer of authority to a legitimate civil entity is conducted during this phase. 
Phase 5: Enable civil authority. The focus of this phase is to enable legitimate 
authorities to provide necessary and essential services to the local populace. Activities 
conducted during this phase require a collective effort between U.S. military force, 
multinational force, interagency support, and nongovernmental agencies to promote a 
favorable transition and to generate a favorable attitude among the populace toward U.S. 
and host nation objectives. 
Phasing helps provide perspective and a way of breaking complex operations into 
manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to “integrate and synchronize related 
activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution” (JCS, 2017, 
p. IV-38). Phases are most often sequential; however, they can also be overlapping or 
ongoing simultaneously. Moreover, phases can represent a single major campaign, or they 
can consist of several subordinate operations being conducted in a series of related 
activities. 
The problem with the current phasing construct is that it might be too linear and is 
not particularly useful for the problems faced by the United States today. For example, the 
linear progression of conflict implied by JP 5-0 (JCS, 2017) assumes the central decisive 
point to be in Phase 3 (Scharre, 2016). Furthermore, JP 5-0 (JCS, 2017) also assumes Phase 
3 is where the bulk of U.S. military attention for resourcing, modernizing, and allocating 
risk is demanded (Scharre, 2016). Essentially, the current phasing construct is ineffective 
at facilitating U.S. understanding of adversarial conflict and the development of solutions 
because it is too restrictive on planners. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General 
Joseph Dunford (2016) has stated that he does not believe the current phasing construct is 
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useful because the United States bends authorities and capabilities according to phasing, 
which he believes is insufficient to deal with adversaries that seek to advance their 
influence while simultaneously avoiding U.S. strengths. 
E. EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS 
This section begins with the definition of EABO and then discusses EABO 
influences, mission types, and desired EABO end-states. The purpose of this section is to 
familiarize the reader with how and why the Marine Corps plans to execute future 
operational wars. Moreover, this information can be used to help determine any disparities 
between current logistics support timelines and CSTs—such that they should be equal and 
or minimized to the greatest extent possible in order to ensure that organic and nonorganic 
capabilities reach and support the warfighter at the same time and under any operational 
circumstance. 
1. Defined 
According to the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook 
(MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 5), “EABO is a future naval operational concept that meets the 
resiliency and forward presence requirements of the next paradigm of U.S. joint 
expeditionary operations.” Moreover, EABO is executed by low-signature naval and joint 
forces to offensively strike and target adversary positions and to defensively form a 
maritime defense in depth. The key aspect of EABO is that the concept is meant to generate 
operational advantages, to expand options during the next paradigm of joint expeditionary 
operations, and to increase operational agility. Most importantly, the EABO concept is 
predicated on fundamental assumptions regarding the dynamics of future wars and the 
likely nature of them being centered around sea and air control. EABO uniquely defines 
adversaries according to strategic importance and geography to develop generic methods 
for dealing with fast moving anti-access/area denial (A2AD) challenges, especially as it 
relates to pacing threats or near peer competitors (MCWL, C&P, 2018). 
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2. EABO Mission Types 
As previously mentioned, the EABO concept is meant to generate operational 
advantages and expand options in the context of A2AD. Moreover, EABO is designed to 
provide benefit across the range of military operations (ROMO), including humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), as well as major combat operations, throughout each 
operational phase of the joint campaign. It is important to note that all EABO missions are 
conducted by forces on an EAB, and they fall into one of two categories—tactical 
operations or operational support activities. More specifically, these mission types include  
surveillance and reconnaissance, air interdiction and missile defense, sea 
control and sea denial, integrated, active, maritime defense to close straights 
to enemy maritime traffic, land-based rotary-wing anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) pouncers, flotilla force operations, swarm missions, mobile FARPS, 
UXX operations of all types, electronic warfare (EW), information 
operations (IO), and cyber, decoy and operational deception activities, and 
last, fleet support activities, battle damage repair, and rearming and 
refueling of surface ships and flotilla forces. (MCWL, C&P, 2018, pp. 23, 
29–30) 
3. EABO Optimization 
To optimize EABO concepts, EABO capabilities must be operationally relevant, 
and they must enable naval forces to exploit key maritime terrain. The capabilities must 
exploit partner proximity, reduce the need for expensive platforms, and place greater 
emphasis on lethal payloads. All of these requirements must be fulfilled given that “EABO 
capabilities and systems are designed to complement the resilient, minimal signature, and 
dispersed nature of EABs,” such that the EABs and the forces they support can “persist 
forward within range of ample adversary long-range precision fires” (MCWL, C&P, 2018, 
p. x). 
4. EABO Operational End-State 
The EABO has broad applicability and is designed to accomplish a wide range of 
mission sets in the most expeditious and agile manner and method possible. In order to 
accomplish these tasks and the assigned the missions conceptualized by EABO, the Navy 
and the Marine Corps will require “new types of forces, organizational structures, and 
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capabilities to persist, partner, and fight within range of adversary long-range fires” 
(MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 49). More specifically, forces must be holistically designed, 
functionally complete, fully integrated, and mutually supporting. This will create 
imperatives and tenets to the naval warfighter challenges that the Marine Corps will have 
to address in order to guide force development and create future inside-force capabilities. 
Some of the imperatives include “generating the virtue of mass without vulnerabilities, 
creating a more dispersed, resilient and hard target forward-basing infrastructure, and 
creating a more resilient CONUS/sea base-to-shore sustainment infrastructure capable of 
supporting distributed forces and operations” (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 50). In addition to 
the EABO imperatives just outlined, there are 14 tenets of EABO that have been developed 
to maximize EABO utility and describe desired force qualities and characteristics. These 
14 tenets are 
• enable economy of force;  
• plan, prepare, and preposition an advantageous force posture;  
• expand capacity with partner capabilities;  
• invert cost imposition to increase the enemy’s relative cost in level of effort, 
time, and expense;  
• enhance relative economy to gain additional capacity;  
• leverage partner proximity to reduce size and improve persistence and cost 
of capabilities;  
• make austerity a virtue to maintain persistent presence (this tenet also relies 
on hearty, user-maintained, logistics-light capabilities and robust, mission- 
focused forces);  
• minimize signature;  
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• balance the EABO force such that smaller capabilities that are inherently 
more resilient and risk-worthy are valued over a smaller number of 
alternatives that are more expensive and maintenance intensive;  
• conserve assault shipping and fleet support assets such that EABO 
capabilities and platforms are capable of conserving the expenditure of 
forward-deployed assets;  
• encourage operational resiliency to operate and flourish under austere 
conditions and within range of long-range precision fires;  
• be naval task force organized; however, be capable of playing host to joint 
capabilities and forces;  
• be mutually supportive of other EABs in order to achieve greater security 
and resiliency; and  
• take calculated risk to provide improved options for commanders to make 
more informed and risk-worthy decisions. (MCWL, C&P, 2018, pp. 50–53) 
5. EABO and Logistics (Deployment, Distribution, and Delivery) 
The future battlespace will be complicated by the proliferation of long-range 
precision fires. This will significantly impact operational requirements as well as demand 
on logistics. This is primarily due to the “race” that will take place between a “willful 
adversary attempting to mass forces” at the decisive point of their choosing and “the ability 
of the defensive forces to supply munitions, relieve forces, and support services to the 
defenders” (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 61). 
In today’s operational environment, the deploying of naval forces requires large 
ships. Although these large ships will contribute to valiant but short battle histories in future 
wars, and will help necessitate sea control and area denial, they pose a credible threat to 
the persistence and survivability of forward-deployed forces. This is because there 
currently exists a paradigm shift between the need for large naval vessels and the demand 
for smaller, more persistent and survivable platforms capable of operating in the littorals. 
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Due to these threats, there will be a shift to smaller, more tactically dispersed platforms 
throughout the inside battlespace. Optimally, the munitions, platforms, equipment, and 
other hard-to-transport items that are needed to support future operations will be 
prepositioned. Success in a future war against a peer competitor is likely to be predicated 
on the “transportation of things” from CONUS under combat conditions. To succeed, the 
United States will need to devise new methods for deploying forces, their equipment, and 
the necessary services needed to support and sustain operations (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 
62). 
To achieve success in a future war against a peer competitor, the logistics 
distribution and support system must be robust and equally resilient. Moreover, linear 
logistics concepts will not suffice; rather, the concepts must be dynamic and revolutionary 
in order to sustain widely distributed forces. On this note, the future logistics distribution 
system will not consist of distribution centers or intermodal transportation hubs; in the 
future operating environment, these would constitute single points of failure. The crux of 
any future EABO logistics distribution concept will be the ability to move all commodities 
away from logistics hubs and onto smaller (potentially more autonomous) platforms that 
are then spread throughout contested seas and EABs to support distributed naval forces 
(MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 62). 
In the near term, the greatest demand on the logistics and supply chain will most 
likely be for aviation parts, fuel, and maintenance. As time progresses, the demand will 
likely grow to include ordnance and other miscellaneous repair parts, which will probably 
prove to be the most challenging commodity, “since other classes of supply can be readily 
contracted or foraged” (MCWL, C&P, 2018, p. 63). Last, attention must be given to the 
fact that any future logistics and supply chain concept must be fully integrated with EABO 
capabilities and concepts of operations (MCWL, C&P, 2018). 
F. MARINE CORPS OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT 
This section begins with the definition of Marine Corps OCS, then goes into more 
detail regarding dollar thresholds, personnel, and CSTs that the Marine Corps currently has 
in place to support nonorganic requirements within the Marine Corps. Last, an overview 
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of the current Marine Corps contracting support flow chart is provided in order to provide 
the reader more context regarding the additional steps that will have to be taken whenever 
a new requirement is presented to the contracting office for acquisition. Ultimately, the 
general purpose of this section is to provide the reader overarching context for the Marine 
Corps CST, which—as it stands—is estimated to take 120 days from the identification of 
a new requirement to the point at which the warfighter finally receives the goods or services 
being requested. 
The procurement sources at the U.S. Marine Corps’ organic disposal are USMC 
ServMart, base-affiliated fuel farms, Global Combat Support System–Marine Corps 
(GCSS–MC), and the government commercial purchase card (GCPC) for goods and 
services below the micro-purchase threshold (MPT). Through these sources, the U.S. 
Marine Corps units are able to buy routine office supplies and specialty goods and services 
below the MPT (e.g., construction or construction material, fuel, Class IX repair parts, and 
other miscellaneous parts associated with major end items). All other requirements must 
be sourced via nonorganic procurement methods (e.g., contracting). 
The GCPC program was developed to streamline small purchases and purchase 
payments, minimize paperwork, eliminate petty cash, and simplify administrative efforts 
associated with the purchase of traditional and emergent supplies and services. The support 
provided by the GCPC comes in the form of a tailored task order and is issued under the 
General Services Administration (GSA) SmartPay contract. The GCPC program adheres 
to the acquisition policies identified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). In addition, the GCPC is 
only used for purchases and contract payments at or below the MPT. If proper written 
authority is given, the GCPC may be used to make payments on contracts above the MPT, 
and it may be used by cardholders (CHs) outside the United States for goods or services 
acquired or performed outside the United States using the simplified acquisition procedures 
(SAP). The head of contracting activity (HCA) issues GCPC contract authority to 
component commands, and the HCA accountable for the performance and management of 
the command’s GCPC program. Among many other GCPC program-related 
responsibilities, all invoices incurred by the use of the GCPC are certified by an appointed 
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certifying officer (CO) after being reviewed and approved by the CH’s approving official 
(AO)—typically the unit supply officer and the CH’s direct supervisor. At the lowest 
echelon possible, the CH uses the GCPC to acquire authorized supplies or services per their 
delegated authority and must comply with statutory, contractual, administrative, and 
locally applicable requirements. Table 1 represents the current dollar MPTs according to 
FAR 2.101 (2020). 
Table 1. Micro-Purchase Thresholds. Source: FAR 2.101 (2020). 




Contingency Operation (Inside United States) $20,000 
Contingency Operation (Outside United States) $30,000 
Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) $250,000 (except for contingency operations) 
SAT (Contingency—Inside United States) $750,000 
SAT (Contingency—Outside United States) $1.5 million 
SAT (Humanitarian/Peacekeeping—Outside United States) $500,000 
 
For all other sourcing requirements that will go through the contracting process, 
there is an associated CST. The CST involves the unit identifying the requirement(s), the 
unit obtaining funding, the unit submitting the requirement package to the KO for 
processing, the contract being awarded, and the contracted requirement being delivered to 
the customer. In total, the CST can take up to 120 days and can be used as a guideline for 
workload planning by the unit, the comptroller, the KO, and the customer to manage 
expectations. Any attempt to truncate the CST may lead to increased risk to contracting 
supportability. Figure 8 graphically displays a generalizable CST. 
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Figure 8. Contract Support Timeline. Source: W. M. Young, personal 
communication, June 27, 2020.3 
Imbedded within the CST are various friction points. For example, the following 
friction points disrupt or delay the CST if not handled accordingly: timely submission and 
approval of waivers; above-threshold requirements that require Requirements Resourcing 
Review Board (R3B) approval; requirements for specialty end items; and sufficiently 
detailed, salient, and timely requirements in the appropriate form (e.g., statement of work 
[SOW], statement of objective [SOO], or performance work statement [PWS]). 
The U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Contract Platoon (ECP) serves to provide 
comprehensive expeditionary contracting support to any size MAGTF or augmentation to 
a joint contracting agency. This includes contracting and purchasing essential supplies and 
services that are not readily available through normal logistic channels or through host-
nation support (HNS) throughout the full ROMO. Typically, the ECP deploys as a four-
Marine team consisting of contracting officers who will perform as both the contracting 
officer for the MAGTF commander and as the OCS advisor. 
Each OCS requirement above the MPT, in the form of a completed requirements 
package, submitted to the ECP for procurement will go through a generalizable 
procurement cycle. Moreover, depending on the dollar amount associated with the 
 
3 This information was communicated via a PowerPoint presentation attached to a personal email on 
June 27, 2020 
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requirements package, the amount of time it takes from acceptance of a complete purchase 
request to the day of award varies. Table 2 can be used as a guideline for workload planning 
by the KO and the customer to manage expectations: 
Table 2. Purchase Request Type with Dollar Amount and Procurement 
Action Lead Time 
Purchase request type Dollar Amount ($) Procurement Action Lead 
Time (PALT) 
Supplies and Services $10,000 to $250,000 30 Days 
Supplies $250,000 up to $999,999 41 Days 
Services $250,000 up to $999,999 46 Days 
Supplies and Services >$1,000,000 60 Days 
 
To facilitate the handling of procurement requirements below the MPT (minimum 
$25,000 warrant), the KO can appoint and train FOOs. An FOO is usually an E-7 or above, 
but a waiver may be granted for a highly qualified E-6. FOOs are authorized to make 
purchases below the MPT and are allowed to obligate government funds for micro-
purchases of supplies and services only. All FOOs remain under the strict operational 
control and oversight of an FOO manager or the designated KO. Prior to the execution of 
any purchase, an FOO must have a valid funding document with the specific funding 
amount and fund citation; a clear description of the supplies, services, or construction being 
purchased; and a certification of funds availability from a funds certification official. The 
FOO must request and obtain additional funds prior to making a purchase for any 
procurement that exceeds the initial amount of the funding document. Last, FOOs may 
place call orders through vendors with an established blanket purchase agreement (BPA) 
and should not use funds to pay for equipment or services already provided by another 
source. These sources include installation property book offices (IPBOs), self- service 
supply centers (SSSCs), or local contracting offices. A master FOO purchase authorization 
list is normally given to the FOO upon appointment. This list details how most items or 
services the FOO is likely to purchase can be obtained. 
According to the requirements sourcing logic of the 3d MLG, contracting is 
considered the last line of logistics support. Before trying to contract a requirement, organic 
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support, GCPC, FOO, and mutual logistics support requests (MLSRs) must first be 
considered. If contracting is considered, Figure 9 depicts a generalizable contracting flow 
chart with assigned timelines for each step of the process. 
 
Figure 9. Contracting Flow Chart (Basic) 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a broad overview of the background associated with Marine 
Corps history, a discussion about the theory of constraints (TOC) and its applicability to 
supply chain optimization (with focus on the Marine Corps), and a discussion of how the 
Marine Corps is currently task organized. Next, this chapter presented the operational 
phases of every military operation. Then it went into detail about EABO: its definition, 
need for optimization, possible mission types, desired end-states, and impacts on logistics. 
Last, this chapter presented an overview of Marine Corps OCS, which discussed the current 
III MEF CST, as well as some of the thresholds that affect Marine Corps operations. As 
previously discussed, by understanding these concepts, the reader is given context and 
foundational knowledge as to how the Marine Corps currently operates, how they plan to 
operate, and why logistics and CSTs are vitally important—especially when it comes to 
ensuring that nonorganic capabilities reach the operational environment at (or near) the 
execution of EABO. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is intended to provide the reader a brief overview of the 
Marine Corps’ aiming point for logistics development and contracting support and of the 
guidance and planning directives that direct it. The first publication of this review is 
Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century (Berger, 2019b). This publication has been written 
to provide the logistics community with guidance for logistics development, priorities, and 
direction in support of future supporting actions. The second publication is the 
Commandant’s Planning Guidance: 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CPG; Berger, 
2019a). The CPG provides strategic direction for the Marine Corps and serves as the 
authoritative planning and priority setting document when it comes to force development. 
Next, this review explores and discusses the past research conducted at the Naval 
Postgraduate School on the topic. By understanding the background, research, 
recommendations, and guidance within these publications and references, a model of 
current and future Marine Corps OCS can be developed to inform EABO–OCS decision-
making from a logistics and contract support timeline synchronization perspective. 
A. SUSTAINING THE FORCE IN THE 21st CENTURY 
The future of logistics and sustainment of maneuver forces will be greatly impacted 
by the future challenges the Marine Corps will face across a full range of military 
operations and in all domains—air, land, sea, space, and cyber. In order to guide the Marine 
Corps in fighting and winning the nation’s battles of the future environment described by 
the National Defense Strategy (NDS), Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century was 
developed (Berger, 2019b). This document specifically describes the steps the Marine 
Corps will take to design, develop, and field logistics capabilities in the future. 
The “logistics enterprise must be configured to enhance the lethality of the MAGTF 
through speed, agility, and survivability” (Berger, 2019b, p. 1). On the battlefield of the 
21st Century, Marine Corps logisticians provide a unique ability to “generate, train, deploy, 
execute, and sustain” forces necessary to fight and win (Berger, 2019b, p. 1). This ability 
requires logisticians and force developers to place a heavy importance on innovation and 
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vision toward the future that looks beyond mere material solutions. The ultimate success 
of the Marine Corps in the future fight will rely upon and be measured by the ability of the 
Marine Corps to sustain operating forces in the face of critical-thinking and rapidly-
evolving adversaries. 
Within Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century (Berger, 2019b), there are 
improvements identified to enhance the lethality of the MAGTF, and it guides the efforts 
of the Marine Corps to highlight risks, develop mitigation strategies, and find solutions that 
enable speed, agility, flexibility, and responsiveness across the logistics enterprise. 
Moreover, this document helps establish a future operating environment to be considered 
when dealing with challenges and developing solutions. For example, the document states 
that the future operating environment will be dominated by complex “terrain, technology 
proliferation, information warfare,” signature management, and “increasingly non-
permissive or denied environments” in the littorals or in close proximity to coastlines 
(Berger, 2019b, pp. 2–3). 
The central idea of Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century is that “Marine Corps 
logistics must sustain combat power in contested environments” (Berger, 2019b, p. 5) To 
achieve this end-state, the Marine Corps has identified four lines of effort (LOE): enable 
global logistics awareness, diversify distribution, improve sustainment, and optimize 
installations to support sustained operations (Berger, 2019b, p. 5). Last, Sustaining the 
Force in the 21st Century will serve as the overarching framework and provide direction 
for developing a model within this research that aligns with service guidance and informs 
logistics force management, force development, and force design. 
B. COMMANDANT’S PLANNING GUIDANCE 
The CPG (Berger, 2019a) provides “strategic direction” and serves as the 
authoritative service-level planning document that the Marine Corps must use when 
navigating the force design and development road map. Within the CPG, there are five 
priority focus areas identified: force design, warfighting, education and training, core 
values, and command and leadership. Regardless of institutional changes enacted, each 
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change will be based on a long-term view and singular focus of where the Marine Corps 
intends to be in the future (Berger, 2019a, p. 1). 
Force design is the 38th CMC’s number one priority. He wants to maintain the 
current MEF structure; however, he realizes that each MEF does not have to be task-
organized the same way. The intent for each MEF is that each one will be designed, 
equipped, and trained to fight and provide stand-in force capability in the MEF’s assigned 
region. Moreover, each MEF will be designed with the inherent capability to persist inside 
adversary WEZs, create a mutually contested space, and enhance naval campaign 
engagement (Berger, 2019a, pp. 2–3). 
To accomplish his force design goals, the 38th CMC wants to model future MEUs 
beyond the traditional three ship model. This is because there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach to the operational challenges likely to be faced by the Marine Corps in the future. 
Moreover, the CMC wants to possess a new fleet that has been designed to be smaller, 
more lethal, and more risk worthy. To achieve this, mission agility must be possessed 
across “sea control, littoral, and amphibious operations” and the force must be enhanced 
for naval expeditionary warfare in contested spaces with purpose-built capabilities 
designed to enable sea denial and guaranteed access (Berger, 2019a, pp. 3–5). 
As the Marine Corps moves beyond concept to implementation, the CMC intends 
to employ the EABO concept to inform how missions against pacing threats will be 
approached. Future force design and development will require force options and 
capabilities consisting of a wider range of advantages to deliver mass, elite warriors, 
innovation, and adaptability. Part of achieving this end-state will be the reliance on logistics 
and security throughout the operating environment. The CMC’s planning guidance will 
serve as a supplemental document to Sustaining the Force in the 21st Century (Berger, 
2019b) and will provide direction for developing a model within this research report that 
aligns the CMC’s planning guidance with modeled logistics force management, force 
development, and force design (Berger, 2019a, pp. 11–12). 
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C. FORCE DESIGN 2030 
Force Design 2030 (Berger, 2020) is supplemental to the CPG disseminated in 
2019 and is intended to describe the progress the Marine Corps must make in order to meet 
principal challenges inherent with designing and developing a future force. In addition, 
Force Design 2030 provides methodology and organization insight and the steps the 
Marine Corps is taking to move current force design efforts forward into the future (Berger, 
2020, p. 1). 
As a consequence of likely future challenges, the Marine Corps must transform 
traditional models for “organizing, training, and equipping the force to meet new desired 
ends” (Berger, 2020, p. 2) This transformation will have implications for the size and 
capacity of current forces in order to free resources to meet necessary capacities and 
capabilities and to make these resources more affordable, distributable, and resilient when 
it comes to operating in complex environments and logistical support. 
From a logistics standpoint, Force Design 2030 recognizes the criticality of 
logistics and the vulnerability impact that logistics support will have on future forces 
operating in contested environments. This is because forces that cannot sustain themselves 
become liabilities. Conversely, Force Design 2030 recognizes that forces that can sustain 
themselves contribute to the Marine Corps’ ability to achieve and maintain a competitive 
advantage while operating in a complex operating environment (Berger, 2020, pp. 5–6). 
Within Force Design 2030, the 38th CMC explicitly states that modeling and 
simulation is necessary to inform logistical requirements and to determine probabilistic 
success in various types of engagements. Moreover, any type of modeling must be 
considerate of “full-scale, empirically based experimentation of the future force in realistic 
maritime and littoral terrain” (Berger, 2020, p. 6). In addition, any modeling and simulation 
must take into consideration the 2019 CPG, must use only approved naval concepts (e.g., 
distributed maritime operations, EABO, and littoral operations in contested environments 
[LOCE] concept), must not be constrained by legacy platforms or programs of record, and 
must be threat-informed from a naval warfare perspective. 
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D. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE THESES 
The following keyword searches were conducted via the NPS Dudley Knox 
Library Theses archive. An asterisk (*) denotes that the keyword search returned a result. 
• Marine Corps contract support timeline 
• Marine Corps logistics support timeline 
• Logistics support timeline 
• *Contract support timeline 
• Logistics and contract support timeline 
• *Logistics support optimization 
• Contract support optimization 
• Logistics support synchronization 
• *Contract support synchronization 
• Logistics and contract support synchronization 
• Logistics and contract support optimization 
• Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations timeline 
• Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations optimization 
• Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations synchronization 
• EABO timeline 
• EABO optimization 
• EABO synchronization 
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The reason these keywords were selected is that each is related to the primary focus 
of this research: logistics and contract support timeline synchronization and optimization, 
as well as EABO timeline synchronization and optimization. Of all of the key word 
searches, the only three keywords to return any results were “contract support timeline,” 
“logistics support optimization,” and “contract support synchronization”; all three returned 
one result each. For the keywords “contract support timeline,” the MBA professional report 
titled An Analysis of Current Operational Contract Support Planning Doctrine (Kimsey, 
2015) was returned. For the keywords “logistics support optimization,” the MBA 
professional report titled Implementing the National Inventory Management Strategy: A 
Case Study of DLA’s National Inventory Management Strategy (NIMS; Diaz et al., 2006) 
was returned. Last, for the keywords “contract support synchronization,” the combined 
MBA professional report and joint professional military education (JPME) supplemental 
title A Collection of JPME Operational Contract Support Case Studies and Vignettes 
(Gilbreath & Moore, 2016) was returned. 
First, with regard to the MBA professional report returned by the keyword search 
“contract support timeline,” the purpose of this research was to analyze OCS “planning 
doctrine for maturity and applicability to singe services” (Kimsey, 2015, p. 1). In summary, 
the MBA professional report argued “for the balanced development of OCS planning 
acquisition and non-acquisition focused resources to effectively integrate this function 
across disciplines” (Kimsey, 2015, p. 74). Within this research report, a notional CST is 
presented; however, it is specific to Army contracting, as it stood in 2011, and does not 
graphically represent the contracting requirements, capabilities, and capacities of the III 
MEF CST presented within this thesis. Moreover, since the MBA professional report is 
focused solely on the application of OCS planning doctrine for maturity and applicability 
to single services, this research report is beyond scope. 
Second, with regard to the MBA professional report returned by the keyword search 
“logistics support optimization,” the purpose of this research was to “analyze NIMS 
preliminary performance metrics in terms of effectiveness and its impact on supply chain 
management within the Navy and DLA” (Diaz et al., 2006, p. i). Presented within the 
research, the DLA NIMS initiative “seeks to manage consumable items from the point of 
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acquisition to the point of consumption for the services” (Diaz et al., 2006, p. i). In 
summary, the report concluded that continued progress is being made in the 
implementation of NIMS; however, DLA delays and backorders caused the researchers to 
conclude that supply chain management in the Navy and DLA has not seen much 
improvement because of NIMS. One of the suggestions for future research contained 
within the professional report indicated that the measures presented may not be reflective 
of the performance of their research, considering their research was specific to their test 
site. Because of this, and the level of location uncertainty inherent with EABO, this 
research is also beyond scope. 
Last, with regard to the MBA professional report and JPME supplemental returned 
by the keyword search “contract support synchronization,” the purpose of this 
supplemental is to “educate joint senior leaders on the importance of the strategic effects 
of operational contract support” (OCS; Gilbreath & Moore, 2016, p. i). Moreover, the 
research presents the concern for OCS as it relates to analyzing the strategic effects of 
contracting, which the researchers state is rarely understood or practiced. The final 
outcome of the MBA professional research report is the development of case studies and 
vignettes to “examine how second- and third-order effects impact the United States’ 
military mission and general interests” (Gilbreath & Moore, 2016, p. i) which are intended 
for use in NPS JPME coursework. Exploring the MBA professional report in more detail 
shows that the keywords “contract support synchronization” only appear in the list of 
acronyms and abbreviations section. Moreover, the actual case studies and vignettes 
developed by the research are only accessed via permission granted by JPME instructors, 
employees of the J4 Logistics Directorate, and NPS faculty. That being said, although the 
outputs of the research are case studies and vignettes designed to educate joint leaders at 
each JPME level, this research is beyond scope because, according to the research 
methodology, “the guides represent a sample of possible questions and potential student 
responses” as of 2016, and the EABO concept is dated 2018 (Gilbreath & Moore, 2016, p. 
23). Therefore, the questions and responses may yield minimal insight into the optimization 
and synchronization of logistics and contract support timelines associated with EABO. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented a literature review with the intent to provide the reader with 
a brief overview of the Marine Corps’ aiming point for logistics development and 
contracting support in the future. This information provides guidance regarding logistics 
development, known priorities, and direction in support of future supporting actions. 
Moreover, the information presented in this chapter provides strategic direction for the 
development of a model that supports future force design and development. Lastly, this 
chapter explored the NPS Theses archive in the attempt to discover past research that could 
be used to support, refine, or enhance this intended purpose of this research project. That 
being said, the results—albeit important in their rights—were found to be beyond scope for 
this research project. Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated a gap in the body of 
knowledge to investigate optimizing estimated logistics support and OCS timelines exists. 
Last, by understanding the information presented within this chapter, the reader is more 
aware of the strategic focus, direction, and priorities, as well as limitations, restraints, and 
constraints that will be used to help model current and future Marine Corps OCS—which 
can then be used, modified, or manipulated to inform EABO-OCS decision-making from 









IV. MODELING METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this project is to develop a model that can be used to gain insight 
into the integration, synchronization, and optimization of logistics support and contract 
support such that the warfighter receives concurrent and consistent support on the 
battlefield. This chapter starts with the estimated Logistics Support Timeline—Contract 
Support Timeline (eLST–CST) modeling plan, then it discusses the eLST–CST model in 
a general context. The chapter closes with a discussion on how the eLST–CST model will 
be represented in Arena Simulation software in preparation for the next chapter—
simulation results and analysis. As this chapter progresses, the various inputs and desirable 
outputs will be presented and discussed to show their validity and importance. In the end, 
this chapter provides the reader with an understanding of the general eLST–CST model 
and various inputs and outputs, and discusses the programming of the eLST-CST model 
into the Arena Simulation software. 
A. PLAN 
The simulation model developed in this chapter provides the Marine Corps with 
information that can help inform decision-makers regarding future force designs, 
organizational structures, and organic as well as non-organic support requirements for 
logistics and contract support. The model begins with the identification of a Marine Corps 
mission type, notional steady-state of baseline contracting, and personnel requirements. 
Contracting personnel requirements are based on the personnel planning factors associated 
with a CLB-CLR. With regard to timelines, this information is based (logistically) on 
established Marine Corps self-sustainment rates and 3d MLG contract support timelines, 
which this research report labels as the non-standardized CST. In addition to the non-
standardized CST, this report presents and discusses the inclusion of a standardized CST 
for incorporation into the final model before running simulations. The purpose of the 
standardized CST is to compare requirements delivery average wait time differences 
between a non-standard CST and a standard CST. Also, the simulation results of the non-
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standardized CST can be compared with the simulated results of a standardized CST as it 
relates to synchronization with the LST. 
To accomplish this analysis, baseline information related to contracting support 
personnel and logistics and contract support timelines is discussed in more detail in the 
following sections and modeled using Arena simulation software. A full simulation will 
capture baseline differences between the LST and the non-standardized and standardized 
CSTs. In addition to the baseline differences, desirable outputs to this model will be the 
number of contracting personnel and time necessary to synchronize the LST and CSTs, as 
well as to optimize Marine Corps contracting support. In the end, the eLST-CST model 
will provide insight into how the Marine Corps can reduce contracting complexity and 
increase contracting support efficiency and effectiveness in the form of time and 
contracting personnel. 
B. BASIC MODEL DESIGN 
In this section, an estimated Logistics Support Timeline (eLST) and contract 
support timeline (CST) will be discussed. The eLST subsection will present background 
information, as well as doctrinal guidelines that were used in the development of an eLST 
model. The CST subsection will present the III MEF OCS process and timelines used in 
the development of a III MEF OCS CST model. Last, this section shows what the eLST 
and CST models graphically look like before attempting to combine the two in a singular 
model or before attempting to standardize a portion of the CST. 
1. Estimated Logistics Support Timeline (eLST) 
The estimated Logistics Support Timeline (eLST) serves as the benchmark timeline 
for which all non-organic support must, to the greatest extent possible, be consistent with, 
aligned to, or optimized to support. This is because the eLST is established based on 
organic capabilities common to all Marine Corps elements (SPMAGTF, MEU, MEB, and 
MEF) and will set the range of days that non-organic capabilities must be ready to support 
Marine Corps operations beyond those of an organic nature. Although the range of days 
inherent with an eLST entails quite a few intricacies of the organic operating environment 
that can dramatically impact range outcomes, for this thesis, exploration of such variables 
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or variances will not be considered. Alternatively, the organic eLST will be standardized 
to mirror the accepted planned days of self-sustainment common to each MAGTF sized 
element within the Marine Corps. 
As previously mentioned, the establishment of eLST date ranges is consistent with 
current Marine Corps days of organic supplies and support sustainment common to each 
MAGTF sized element of the Marine Corps. For example, a MEU deploys with up to 15 
days of self-sustainment, a MEB deploys with up to 30 days of self-sustainment, and a 
MEF deploys with up to 60 days of self-sustainment (MCRP 5–12D, 2016, pp. 1–3, 1–6, 
1–9). Last, for SPMAGTFs, considering they are normally the size of a MEU or smaller 
depending on their assigned mission, their self-sustainment capability is assumed to be 
similar to that of a MEU or shorter due to potentially conducting missions of limited scope 
or duration. That being said, for this research, no less than 15 days will be considered when 
it comes to modeling the synchronization of the eLST and the contract support timeline. 
2. Contract Support Timeline 
The CST serves as the piece of the modeling process that will be modeled in 
accordance with current III MEF contracting capacities, with attention given to the number 
of personnel and time necessary to execute the contract support process. Moreover, it will 
also be the piece of the model that will be manipulated to identify aspects for optimization 
and synchronization as it relates to the eLST. Recall that the CST is the process associated 
with sourcing requirements beyond the micro-purchase thresholds established by the FAR. 
In addition, recall that any requirement beyond organic capabilities—for example, 
purchases made with the GCPC—must go through the contracting process. Last, it is 
important to remember that under current III MEF standard contracting timelines, 
requirements can take up to 120 days from the initial identification of requirements to the 
delivery of the supplies or services to the warfighter. Equally important to remember is that 
any attempts to expedite the current CST, without some form of standardization, is likely 
to delay the overall CST (W. M. Young, personal communication, June 27, 2020). As is 
discussed in more detail in the following section, this will be considered a non-standardized 
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CST. This is because nothing has been put into place or standardized when it comes to 
contracting support. 
Next, this research report details the input timelines and personnel requirements 
necessary to execute the current 3d MLG CST. Figure 10 depicts a very broad 
representation of the eLST that is used in the modeling process. Again, it is important to 
acknowledge that this timeline does not take into account the planning intricacies of 
operational variables that may override, alter, or modify timelines associated with 
operational tempo; rather, this timeline assumes a planning window of 30 to 45 days and 
is strictly representative of self-sustainment days at each level of the MAGTF. Although 
future research efforts might focus on a more detailed version of the proposed eLST, for 
this research report, these timelines are considered acceptable based on Marine Corps 
doctrine for organic support. 
 
Figure 10. Estimated Logistics Support Timeline (eLST). 
Presented earlier in this research report is the current 3d MLGs CST. As discussed, 
this timeline demonstrated that it would take approximately 120 days for the unit to identify 
requirements for delivering physical goods or services to warfighters. Regional 
Contracting Offices typically use 120 days as a non-standardized requirement planning 
factor. For example, the 3d MLG plans for a 90-day lead time for units to obtain funding 
from comptrollers, a 60-day lead time for units to submit a completed requirements 
packages to the RCO, and a 30-day lead time for requirements to be awarded contracts and 
for vendors to take action on awarded contracts. Figure 11 represents the CST as used in 
this report. 
Estimated Logistics Execution Timeline (eLET)
MEF: 60 days    MEB: 30 days    MEU/SPMAGTF: 15 days
(Date range estimated based on current Marine Corps standards for self-sustainment at each element of the MAGTF)
Estimated Logistics Planning Timeline (eLPT)
(Date range estimated based on mission urgency or issuance of a planning directive) 
~30-45 days from mission execution
Estimated Logistics Support Timeline (eLST)
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Figure 11. Non-Standardized Contract Support Timeline 
In the next section, this research report discusses how the eLST and the current 
“non-standardized” CST can be modeled to better understand how the two can be 
synchronized to enhance operational effectiveness and then potentially optimized to 
facilitate operational efficiencies. For the remainder of this research report, this model is 
referred to as the eLST-CST model. The next section adds to the eLST-CST model by 
incorporating a “standardized” CST. The purpose of incorporating this information is to 
demonstrate the potential opportunities for standardizing parts of the current CST through 
standardized, non-organic OCS supplies and services. 
C. ESTIMATE LOGISTICS SUPPORT TIMELINE—CONTRACT SUPPORT 
TIMELINE (ELST-CST) MODEL 
Although the self-supported nature of the Marine Corps’ LCE brings with it the 
essential CSS capabilities, it is not without limitations, especially when it comes to non-
organic support beyond anticipated days of self-sustainment. By first recognizing that the 
LCE organic capabilities are finite and not easily replenished under various operational 
conditions, it is easily understood and recognized that non-organic requirements will be an 
inherent aspect of any mission. The problem is that the eLST and CST are often not looked 
at together to ensure that, when the finite limitations of the LCE CSS are exhausted or 
restricted, or when replenishments cannot make it to the warfighter, the non-organic 
requirements can reduce friction and continue to sustain operations. Moreover, by 
combining both the eLST and CST into one model, one can then begin to more holistically 
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recognize the potential future force design and development opportunities that will help 
deliver a wider range of advantages to deliver mass, elite warriors, innovation, and 
adaptability for any assigned mission. Moreover, it may provide insight into the 
development of optimized contracting organizational structures and capabilities necessary 
to execute any Marine Corps mission. 
The one piece of the model currently not presented or discussed in this research 
report is that of a “standardized” CST. The only major difference between the non-
standardized CST and the standardized CST is that the standardized CST takes the initiative 
to establish operational phase phase-0 contracts based on historical spend data. The benefit 
of these phase-0 contracts is that it removes the 60-day lead-time associated with a unit 
identifying requirements, obtaining funding, and submitting the requirements package to 
the RCO for fulfillment. For example, RAND (2008) identified construction supplies, 
vehicles, and construction services that were common supplies and services throughout all 
phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Figure 12 identifies various spend categories and 
applicable contracting transactions common to Operation Iraqi Freedom for Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2003 and FY2004. Although some of these supplies and services may not be 
applicable to all operations, they do provide insight into the types of supplies and services 
most suited for contract standardization. 
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Figure 12. Obligations and Total Transactions by Category, Operation Iraqi 
Freedom FY2003 and FY2004. Source: RAND (2008). 
The downside to this reduction in lead-time is the intrinsic cost associated with 
establishing readily executable contracts. However, it should be worth considering the 
unmeasurable extrinsic cost associated with mission delay or interruption, especially when 
conducting operations in austere locations against a peer adversary. Figure 13 depicts the 
“standardized” CST that is incorporated into the model developed by this research report. 
 
Figure 13. Standardized Contract Support Timeline 
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1. Defined 
The eLST-CST model consists of three integral parts. The eLST, a non-
standardized CST, and a standardized CST. As previously discussed, the eLST represents 
the organic capabilities of the Marine Corps LCE and is established based on current 
planning estimates and days of self-sustainment at each level of the MAGTF. Next, the 
non-standardized CST is the timeline associated with placing new unit requirements on 
contract that exceed the current MPT as established by the FAR. Last, the standardized 
CST is a new concept and is incorporated within the eLST-CST model to demonstrate one 
step in reducing capacity requirements, while at the same time taking steps toward 
optimizing and synchronizing the eLST and the CST. Figure 14 depicts the developed 
eLST-CST model that will be used as a reference to develop the Arena Simulation model 
in the next section. 
 
Figure 14. LST-CST Model 
(Non-Standardized) Contract Support Timeline ~120 days
(Date range estimated based on non-standardized contract support)
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Taking a further look at the eLST-CST model, it will start with the type of mission 
selected or assigned, and then it will naturally progress through the remainder of the model 
traveling down its respective path. For this research report, the assigned mission will 
remain within the realm of EABO; however, the model is generic enough to support any 
possible Marine Corps mission. Based on this information, it will naturally flow into the 
requirements normally required during that type of mission. Although the split between 
organic and non-organic requirements will be dictated by the risk and duration of an 
assigned mission, it is understood that at a minimum some form of contracted support will 
be necessary for all operations, such as construction material, rental vehicles, and restroom 
facilities, among many others. Based on this understanding, a generic split in requirements 
will be assigned to the various mission selected or deemed appropriate. Next, the model 
splits between organic logistics support and non-organic contracting support. Advancing 
along the organic logistics support section of the model, it will immediately be assigned a 
date range based on basic planning factors and the size of the element executing the type 
of mission selected. Again, the planning factor will be between 30 and 45 days, and the 
self-sustainment range will be 60 days for a MEF, 30 days for a MEB, and 15 days for a 
MEU or SPMAGTF. As for the contracted support delay range, it will be based on whether 
or not the requirement is already on a contract or not. For those requirements not on 
contract, the delay will be 120 days. For those requirements already on contract, the delay 
will be 60 days. The 60-day delay is assigned because it removes the lead-times associated 
with a unit identifying new requirements and the comptrollers approving funding—30 
days, respectively, for both lead times, for an overall total reduction in CST delay of 60 
days. 
The first question the model asks when looking at contracted requirements is 
whether or not the requirement is already on an existing contract. As previously discussed, 
the answer to this question will dictate the estimated CST delay, which is driven by the 
steps necessary to acquire the identified mission requirement. If the identified requirement 
is on an existing contract, the CST is estimated to take 60 days and will consist of a unit 
identifying and submitting requirements in the same step, a contract being awarded, and 
the contract executed. Alternatively, if the identified requirement is not on an existing 
 52 
contract, the CST is estimated to take 120 days and will consist of a unit identifying the 
requirement, comptrollers approving funds, a complete requirements package being 
delivered to an RCO, a contract awarded, and the vendor finally delivering the requirement 
to the warfighter. 
2. Inputs 
The inputs to the model are (1) the unit S4, (2) the unit’s respective G8 comptroller, 
(3) the number of contracting personnel, and (4) time as it relates to logistics (organic) and 
contracted (non-organic) support. First, with regard to contracting personnel, it is assumed 
for the purposes of this model and based on the CLB-CLR concept that each element of 
the MAGTF will be accompanied by one KO, two FOO, and two PA. However, for 
simulation purposes, a single KO will act as the input, considering they will be the only 
ones able to award contracts, even though they are supported by a staff of FOOs and PAs. 
Although deviations are likely to occur based on actual manpower figures, for simulation 
purposes, these numbers will serve as the baseline input parameters for contracting 
personnel. Second, and as previously discussed, time for logistics support is established 
based on days of self-sustainment at each element of the MAGTF, and time for contracted 
support is based on whether the requirement is on an existing contract and has to go through 
a complete contracting process.  
3. Outputs 
The outputs to the model are the average wait time for contracted goods or services 
to be delivered to the warfighter, as well as the impact to the average wait time based on 
(1) the number of warranted contracting officers working to award contracts, (2) a delay in 
contract planning and execution, and (3) the standardization of contracting support. In 
addition, an output to the model will be the maximum, minimum, and average wait time 
expected for goods or services to be delivered to the warfighter depending on the level of 
MAGTF submitting the contracting requirement. From these outputs, the CMC, 
commanders, and other Marine Corps leadership alike can begin to develop and potentially 
implement changes to the current III MEF contracting organizational structure, manpower, 
or contracting capabilities. In addition, the Marine Corps can use the outputs generated to 
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standardize III MEF OCS processes so that the eLST and the CSTs are aligned, 
synchronized, and optimized to support assigned missions, especially EABO. 
D. ARENA MODEL DESIGN 
The next logical step in the modeling process is to program the basic model 
presented in the last section in the modeling and simulation software. For this research 
project, Arena Simulation software by Rockwell Automation was chosen because of its 
user-friendly interface. The software is flexible enough for future use in that it allows for 
the incorporation of additional hierarchical structures to increase (or decrease) the 
complexity of the developed model. 
Throughout this section, each component of the Arena model is presented and 
discussed in a manner that makes the process generalizable and repeatable. First, the 
programming of the eLST is discussed. Second, the non-standardized CST is discussed. 
Last, a standardized CST is discussed. Along the way, a graphical representation of each 
portion of the arena model is presented to show what it would look like before running 
simulations. Table 3 later in this chapter summarizes how to program each portion of the 
model. The next few sections provide more detail and clarification to support modeling 
parameter decision-making. 
1. Arena Model—eLST 
To start this portion of the model, bear in mind that there are three different MAGTF 
element sizes—a MEF, a MEB, and a MEU (SPMAGTF included). Recall also that each 
element size is assigned the same planning timeline of 30 to 45 days for modeling purposes 
only, and actual time may be different based on planning guidance or criticality of an 
assigned mission. Figure 15 represents a basic Marine Corps eLST for each MAGTF size 
and is based on information contained within this research report. 
 54 
 
Figure 15. Estimated Logistics Support Time Line Arena Overview 
One focus area of this project is to synchronize the eLST and CST to support 
EABO. In the future it is anticipated that smaller and smaller footprints will be the norm; 
therefore, the focus here will be on programming a MEU level requirement. To alternate 
between MAGTF element sizes, the only required changes will be to the arrival rate (60 
days for a MEF, or 30 days for a MEB) and the entity type so that the requirement may be 
tracked throughout the simulation. All other parameters are common to all. 
2. Arena Model—CST (Non-Standardized) 
Next, how the non-standardized CST was constructed in the arena model will be 
discussed. Recall that the process being modeled is that of III MEF Marine Corps and is 
representative, in the most basic sense, of the environment the CMC has identified as the 
point of focus for future combat development. Against this background, the model is 
generalizable enough that slight modifications can be made to easily represent the CSTs 
associated with other MAGTF elements. Figure 16 captures the basic non-standardized 
CST modeled within the arena model. 
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Figure 16. Contract Support Time Line (Non-Standardized) 
Regardless of the assigned mission, requirements could be generated in one of four 
categories: 
1. Requirements for supplies and services between $10,000 and $249,999 
2. Requirements for supplies between $250,000 and $999,999 
3. Requirements for services between $250,000 and $999,999 
4. Requirements for supplies or services greater than $1,000,000 
For this research project, each requirement is independent of the other; therefore, each 
requirement is represented by a single server model. As a whole, each process represents 
the entire non-standardized CST model. 
3. Arena Model—CST (Standardized) 
In the previous section, the non-standardized CST modeling process was discussed. 
In this section, the standardized CST is presented. The only major difference between the 
two is that the “Unit ID Requirements,” “Unit Obtains Funding,” and “Unit Submits 
Requirement” process blocks have been consolidated into one process block. The process 
blocks have been consolidated based on the assumption that standing contracts exist within 
the system that are fully funded and orders (task or delivery) can be made against the 
contracts without additional steps being required in the process. Also, the “Execution and 
Delay,” “Delivered to Warfighter,” and “Contract Execution” blocks have not changed 
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with regard to the parameters programmed. Figure 17 represents the basic standardized 
CST modeled within the arena model. 
 
Figure 17. Contract Support Time Line (Standardized) 
As with the non-standard Contract Support Time Line arena model, regardless of 
the assigned mission, requirements could be generated in one of four categories: 
1. Requirements for supplies and services between $10,000 and $249,999 
2. Requirements for supplies between $250,000 and $999,999 
3. Requirements for services between $250,000 and $999,999 
4. Requirements for supplies or services greater than $1,000,000 
In addition, for this research project, each standardized requirement is independent of the 
other; therefore, each requirement is represented by a single server model. As a whole, 
each process represents the entire standardized CST model. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the methodology used to develop the eLST-CST model, both 
from a general perspective, as well as within the Arena Simulation software. First, this 
chapter presented a plan for model development and discussed the eLST. Second, this 
chapter presented the non-standardized and standardized CST, with focus and attention on 
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the processes and day ranges associated with each timeline. Third, this chapter combined 
everything—the eLST and the two CSTs—to present the eLST-CST model. Fourth, this 
chapter discussed the various inputs and desirable outputs of the developed model. Last, 
this chapter explained how the model will be programmed in Arena Simulation software. 
The eLST-CST model presented within this chapter provides a graphical representation of 
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The eLST-CST model developed in Chapter IV allowed for comparative analysis 
between the proposed and existing non-organic OCS processes. The results were then 
compared and analyzed with an emphasis toward synchronizing the eLST with the CST so that 
the time between when the requirement identified by the warfighter to when the warfighter 
might expect to receive said requirement in the operating environment are near equal. To 
improve the measurement of timeliness, throughput, and synchronization, the theory of 
constraints was used in the model. The measurements are defined for use herein as 
Timeliness: Meets or exceeds warfighter requirement demand or is earlier than 
their required delivery date. The outcome for timeliness to be measured by the model is a 
delivery time to the warfighter that is less than, equal to, or greater than the accumulated 
average number of days considered between the number of planning days and days when 
self-sustainment expires. 
Throughput: The quantity of warfighter requirements of a specified type being 
fulfilled by the system over a given period. The outcome for throughput to be assessed by 
the model is the difference between the average requirement type output of the existing 
process and of the average requirement type output when the process is altered, or an 
additional capacity is added to the system. 
The purpose of the proposed model is to demonstrate that (1) the current Marine 
Corps eLST and III MEF OCS CST are not currently aligned to meet warfighter needs, and 
(2) the existing eLST-CST process, informed by standardized supplies and services 
requirements in Phase-0, can be optimized to increase timeliness and throughput 
throughout the remaining phases of EABO. 
The data presented in this chapter shows, through the standardization of the eLST-
CST model, significant savings in the time it takes to fulfill requirements. This results in 
quicker delivery of organic and non-organic operational requirements to the warfighter. 
The data also shows that an increase in the number of contracting officers working on 
requirements does not improve the timeliness of requirements being delivered to the 
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warfighter. Last, the data shows that, although there are slight increases in throughput when 
the number of contracting officers required to work increases to two, there are marginal 
increases to non-organic requirements throughput when the number of contracting officers 
is increased further. 
A. RESULTS 
The eLST and the NSCS model represent the current Marine Corps logistics 
planning and support cycle, as well as the current III MEF OCS process. For all 
experiments, the NSCS model is defined as the base model since it represents to the best 
extent possible the current III MEF OCS process. In total, there are three simulations run 
with multiple different scenarios each. The simulations focused on (1) total time in the 
system or time it takes to deliver requirements to the warfighter, (2) contracting officer 
throughput capacity, and (3) the non-organic support synchronization with organic support 
at the MEF, MEB, and MEU levels. Within each of these simulations, scenarios were 
developed based on changes in personnel and changes in contracting support planning and 
execution delay. 
B. TOTAL TIME IN SYSTEM/TIME TO THE WARFIGHTER 
The total time in the system is the same as the time to the warfighter and was 
expressed in days. Each scenario is compared to the base eLST-CST model. The model 
identifies the total time each requirement type or “entity” spends within the system. For 
example, prior to process standardization, the baseline eLST-CST model data showed it 
would take the current OCS process 148 days on average for routine supplies and services 
between $10,000 and $249,999 to be delivered to the warfighter. It would take 164 days 
on average for supplies between $250,000 and $999,999, 156 days on average for services 
between $250,000 and $999,999, and 176 days on average for supplies or services greater 
than $1,000,000. Now, when the current operational contract support (OCS) requirements 
are standardized, the average total time in the system for each requirement type decreases. 
For example, standardizing the current OCS process decreased the average time it took to 
deliver requirements to warfighters by 87 days for standardized routine supplies and 
services between $10,000 and $249,000, 66 days for supplies between $250,000 and 
 61 
$999,999, 53 days for services between $250,000 and $999,999, and an average decrease 
of 47 days for supplies and services greater than $1,000,000. 
Another aspect that was considered is the impact a delay in OCS planning and 
execution had on the total time in the system each type of requirement takes before 
anticipated arrival to the warfighter. To measure the impact in timeliness, six different 
scenarios were developed, each relating to delays of 1 day, 1–4 weeks, and 1–3 months in 
contracting planning and execution. The data shows that a delay in contracting planning 
and execution has varied results. What is certain is that standardizing the Marine Corps 
contracting support requirements does have an overall positive impact on decreasing the 
average time it takes to fulfill warfighter operational requirements, regardless of the delay 
in OCS planning and execution. What is less certain is the degree of timeliness at which 
requirements can be delivered to the warfighter when OCS planning and execution is 
delayed. For example, when the OCS process is delayed by a single day, the average time 
it takes to get a requirement to the warfighter ranges between 61 days and 130 days (a 
spread of 69 days), depending on the type of requirement and dollar value. When the 
process is delayed by 7–14 days, the average wait time range varies between 74 days and 
133 days (a spread of 59 days). By delaying the OCS process by up to 1 month (21–30 
days), the average wait time for delivery of requirements to the warfighter is anticipated to 
range between 94 days and 149 days (a spread of 55 days) depending on the requirement 
type. Table 3 shows in greater detail all scenarios simulated and the impact that 






Table 3. Average Time in Days for Requirement to be Delivered to the 
Warfighter Based on OCS Delay 
 
 
C. CONTRACTING OFFICER THROUGHPUT CAPACITY 
Contracting officer throughput capacity is the measurement of how many of a given 
requirement type can be fulfilled over a predetermined period. For this research, the period 
was established as 270 workdays out of a 365-day year, with a prescribed 12-hour workday. 
The data shows that under the current contracting support timelines, a single contracting 
officer (KO) can theoretically only fulfill at most over the simulated time frame one supply 
and service requirement between $10,000 and $249,999, two supply type requirements 
between $250,000 and $999,999, one service type requirement between $250,000 and 
$999,999, and two supply and service type requirements greater than $1,000,000. 
Moreover, the data also shows that regardless of the extent of the delay, a contracting 
support planning and execution delay has a negligible impact on the throughput of 
requirements to the warfighter for all types of requirements. 
In addition, simulations were run to compare the impact that adding additional KOs 
to the current OCS process would have on requirements throughput. The data shows that 
by adding one or more additional KOs into the system, there is minimal to no impact on 
requirements throughput. 
Next, simulations were run to compare the impact that standardizing some of the 
current III MEF OCS process would have on requirements throughput. The data shows 
there is a significant increase in requirements throughput for all types of requirements, 
where the greatest increases in throughput were seen for supplies and services between 




NSCS S and S SCS S and S Difference NSCS Supplies SCS Supplies Difference NSCS Services SCS Services Difference NSCS S and S $1m SCS S and S $1m Difference
0-1 Days 148 61 87 164 98 66 156 103 53 176 130 47
1-7 Days 144 66 77 153 105 47 168 111 57 185 121 64
7-14 Days 126 74 52 165 109 56 185 121 64 181 133 49
14-21 Days 141 76 65 175 123 52 192 120 72 178 152 27
21-30 Days 148 94 54 196 127 69 188 134 54 188 149 38
30-90 Days 194 118 76 195 184 11 206 185 21 UNK 160 UNK
Average Time in Days for Requirement to be Delivered to the Warfighter based on OCS Delay
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throughput for supplies and services greater than $1,000,000 only marginally increased 
with the standardization of the current III MEF OCS process. 
Last, simulations were run to compare the difference in requirement throughput 
when the current III MEF OCS process was standardized, as well as when additional KOs 
were added to the system. The data shows there were additional increases in requirement 
throughput for all types of requirements, excluding supplies and services greater than 
$1,000,000, wherein increases in requirement throughput was only marginal when 
compared to standardizing the requirements alone. Tables 4 and 5 summarize all of the 
simulations and results discussed within this section. 
Table 4. Requirement Throughput with 1 KO based on OCS Delay 
 
Table 5. Requirement Throughput with 2 KOs based on OCS Delay 
 
 
D. NON-ORGANIC SUPPORT FOR MEF, MEB, AND MEU 
The last section of this chapter focuses on determining the degree to which the 
eLST and CST are synchronized so that the warfighter is receiving their requirement, 
regardless of type and dollar value, when they are anticipated to need it based on the days 
of self-sustainment for each MAGTF size. The data shows that the current III MEF OCS 




NSCS S and S 
Throughput













NSCS S and S $1m 
Throughput
SCS S and S $1m 
Throughput
Difference
0-1 Days 1 6 5 2 5 3 1 4 3 2 3 1
1-7 Days 1 8 7 1 5 4 2 4 2 1 3 2
7-14 Days 3 3 0 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 3 2
14-21 Days 2 7 5 1 4 3 1 4 3 1 3 2
21-30 Days 2 7 5 1 4 3 2 3 1 1 2 1
30-90 Days 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 0 2 2
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NSCS S and S $1m 
Throughput
SCS S and S $1m 
Throughput
Difference
0-1 Days 1 7 6 1 8 7 1 8 7 1 3 2
1-7 Days 0 10 10 1 8 7 2 8 6 2 5 3
7-14 Days 1 10 9 1 7 6 2 7 5 1 5 4
14-21 Days 3 9 6 1 8 7 1 7 6 1 4 3
21-30 Days 2 8 6 1 6 5 2 5 3 1 4 3
30-90 Days 2 2 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 3 2
Requirement Throughput with 2 KO based on OCS Delay
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self-sustainment expires, regardless of the size of the MAGTF being supported. Also, the 
data showed that a delay in OCS planning and execution up to 0–1 days after the original 
identification of a requirement in the mission planning cycle was optimal when it came to 
minimizing average days the warfighter was likely to wait before their operational 
requirement was received. 
Next, simulations were run to compare the difference in eLST and CST 
synchronization and warfighter requirement supportability when the current III MEF OCS 
requirements were standardized. The data showed a significant increase in synchronization 
and supportability, as well as a significant decrease in average days of waiting for 
requirements faced by the warfighter. Furthermore, although requirements related to 
supplies or services beyond the $249,999 threshold were still found to result in significant 
wait times for the warfighter, supply and service requirements between $10,000 and 
$249,999 were found to arrive close to the time the warfighter was likely to need them, 
especially when the delay in contracting support planning and execution was delayed no 
more than 1–7 days. From an EABO support perspective, assuming that a portion of 
requirements will be non-organic, only when the OCS process is standardized does the 
non-organic support come even close to being available to support the warfighter’s needs 
at the point when days of self-sustainment are anticipated to expire. This is applicable 
across all requirement types and is suitable for any assigned mission, which is why the 
model developed within this research report is suitable to support EABO-OCS 
optimization, enhance EABO endstate, and support the deployment, distribution, and 
delivery of requirements in support of EABO at all levels of the MAGTF. Tables 6 and 7 
summarize all of the simulations and results discussed within this section. 
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Table 6. Non-Standardized CST Impact to Delivery of Supplies and Services Summary 
 
Planning (# Days)
Self Sustainment (# 
Days)
Days before Needed 
Resupply
MEU 30-45 15 45-60
MEB 30-45 30 60-75
MEF 30-45 60 90-105
Contracting Support Type NON-Standardized
Workdays 270
Work hours/day 12
Purchase Type Supplies and Services
Threshold $10,000-$249,999
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 148 -103 -88 -95 -88 -73 -80 -58 -43 -50
2 1-7 (within a week) 144 -99 -84 -91 -84 -69 -76 -54 -39 -46
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 126 -81 -66 -74 -66 -51 -59 -36 -21 -29
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 141 -96 -81 -89 -81 -66 -74 -51 -36 -44
5 21-30 (within a month) 148 -103 -88 -95 -88 -73 -80 -58 -43 -50
6 30-90 (within 1 to 3 months) 194 -149 -134 -141 -134 -119 -126 -104 -89 -96
Purchase Type Supplies
Threshold $250,000-$999,999
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 164 -119 -104 -111 -104 -89 -96 -74 -59 -66
2 1-7 (within a week) 153 -108 -93 -100 -93 -78 -85 -63 -48 -55
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 165 -120 -105 -113 -105 -90 -98 -75 -60 -68
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 175 -130 -115 -123 -115 -100 -108 -85 -70 -78
5 21-30 (within a month) 196 -151 -136 -144 -136 -121 -129 -106 -91 -99
6 30-90 (within 1 to 3 months) 195 -150 -135 -142 -135 -120 -127 -105 -90 -97
Purchase Type Services
Threshold $250,000-$999,999
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 156 -111 -96 -103 -96 -81 -88 -66 -51 -58
2 1-7 (within a week) 168 -123 -108 -115 -108 -93 -100 -78 -63 -70
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 185 -140 -125 -133 -125 -110 -118 -95 -80 -88
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 192 -147 -132 -139 -132 -117 -124 -102 -87 -94
5 21-30 (within a month) 188 -143 -128 -135 -128 -113 -120 -98 -83 -90
6 30-90 (within 1 to 3 months) 206 -161 -146 -153 -146 -131 -138 -116 -101 -108
Purchase Type Supplies and Services >$1M
Threshold $1,000,000+
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 176 -131 -116 -124 -116 -101 -109 -86 -71 -79
2 1-7 (within a week) 185 -140 -125 -132 -125 -110 -117 -95 -80 -87
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 181 -136 -121 -129 -121 -106 -114 -91 -76 -84
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 178 -133 -118 -126 -118 -103 -111 -88 -73 -81
5 21-30 (within a month) 188 -143 -128 -135 -128 -113 -120 -98 -83 -90



















Self Sustainment (# 
Days)
Days before Needed 
Resupply
MEU 30-45 15 45-60
MEB 30-45 30 60-75
MEF 30-45 60 90-105
Contracting Support Type Standardized
Workdays 270
Work hours/day 12
Purchase Type Supplies and Services
Threshold $10,000-$249,999
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 61 -16 -1 -9 -1 14 6 29 44 36
2 1-7 (within a week) 66 -21 -6 -14 -6 9 1 24 39 31
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 74 -29 -14 -21 -14 1 -6 16 31 24
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 76 -31 -16 -24 -16 -1 -9 14 29 21
5 21-30 (within a month) 94 -49 -34 -42 -34 -19 -27 -4 11 3
6 30-90 (within 1 to 3 months) 118 -73 -58 -65 -58 -43 -50 -28 -13 -20
Purchase Type Supplies
Threshold $250,000-$999,999
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 98 -53 -38 -46 -38 -23 -31 -8 7 -1
2 1-7 (within a week) 105 -60 -45 -53 -45 -30 -38 -15 0 -8
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 109 -64 -49 -56 -49 -34 -41 -19 -4 -11
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 123 -78 -63 -71 -63 -48 -56 -33 -18 -26
5 21-30 (within a month) 127 -82 -67 -74 -67 -52 -59 -37 -22 -29
6 30-90 (within 1 to 3 months) 184 -139 -124 -131 -124 -109 -116 -94 -79 -86
Purchase Type Services
Threshold $250,000-$999,999
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 103 -58 -43 -50 -43 -28 -35 -13 2 -5
2 1-7 (within a week) 111 -66 -51 -58 -51 -36 -43 -21 -6 -13
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 121 -76 -61 -69 -61 -46 -54 -31 -16 -24
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 120 -75 -60 -67 -60 -45 -52 -30 -15 -22
5 21-30 (within a month) 134 -89 -74 -81 -74 -59 -66 -44 -29 -36
6 30-90 (within 1 to 3 months) 185 -140 -125 -132 -125 -110 -117 -95 -80 -87
Purchase Type Supplies and Services >$1M
Threshold $1,000,000+
Scenario Planning/Execution Delay Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg) Delay (MAX) Delay (MIN) Delay (Avg)
1 0-1 (immediately) 130 -85 -70 -77 -70 -55 -62 -40 -25 -32
2 1-7 (within a week) 121 -76 -61 -68 -61 -46 -53 -31 -16 -23
3 7-14 (within 2 weeks) 133 -88 -73 -80 -73 -58 -65 -43 -28 -35
4 14-21 (within 3 weeks) 152 -107 -92 -99 -92 -77 -84 -62 -47 -54
5 21-30 (within a month) 149 -104 -89 -97 -89 -74 -82 -59 -44 -52

















This chapter demonstrated that when standardizing the current III MEF OCS 
process, the eLST and CST can become more synchronized, and when additional KOs are 
added to the system, requirement throughput increases, although only marginally for some 
requirements. Also, this chapter demonstrates that there are additional increases in 
throughput and decreases in time for requirements to be delivered to the warfighter when 
the CST is standardized, and additional KOs are within the system. Last, this chapter 
showed that the current Marine Corps eLST and III MEF OCS CST are not in alignment 
and that the warfighter is incapable of receiving requirements beyond the $10,000 threshold 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary of the material used to conduct research, the 
methodology used to model and simulate EABO-OCS scenarios from a contracting process 
and personnel perspective, and the results of the simulations. This chapter also provides 
conclusions based on research and answers to the research questions proposed in the first 
chapter. Finally, this chapter concludes with recommendations and areas of future research. 
A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH REPORT 
Chapter II provided a broad overview of Marine Corps history, a discussion about 
the theory of constraints (TOC) and its applicability to supply chain optimization (with a 
focus on Marine Corps), and then it discussed how the Marine Corps is currently task 
organized to support assigned missions. Next, Chapter II presented the operational phases 
of every military operation before going into great detail about EABO, its definition, need 
for optimization, possible mission types, desired end-states, and impacts on logistics. 
Chapter II also presented an overview of Marine Corps OCS, which discussed the current 
III MEF OCS CST as well as some of the thresholds that the Marine Corps must consider 
when choosing to contract out operational requirements. Finally, Chapter II provided 
context and foundational knowledge as to how the Marine Corps currently operates, how 
they plan to operate, and why logistics and contract support timelines are vitally important, 
especially when it comes to ensuring non-organic capabilities reach the operational 
environment at (or near) the execution of an assigned mission. 
Chapter III presented a literature review with the intent to provide the reader with 
a brief overview of the Marine Corps’ aiming point for logistics development and 
contracting support in the future. Moreover, Chapter III provided information and guidance 
regarding logistics development, known Marine Corps logistics and contracting priorities, 
and direction in support of future logistics and contracting efforts. Next, Chapter III 
presented information that provided strategic direction for the development of a model that 
supports future force design and development from a contracting support perspective. Last, 
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Chapter III explored the NPS Theses archive in an attempt to discover past research that 
could be used to support, refine, or enhance the intended purpose of this research project. 
Chapter IV outlined the methodology used to develop the eLST-CST model, both 
from a general perspective and within the Arena Simulation software. First, Chapter IV 
provided a plan for model development, then it presented and discussed the eLST. Second, 
Chapter IV presented the non-standardized and standardized CST, with focus and attention 
given to the processes and day ranges associated with each timeline. Third, Chapter IV 
combined the eLST and the two CSTs to present the eLST-CST model. Fourth, Chapter IV 
discussed in detail how the model will be programmed in preparation for simulation. Last, 
Chapter IV provided a graphical representation of what the current III MEF eLST-CST 
model looks like in an extremely simplified form. 
Chapter V demonstrated that when standardizing the current III MEF OCS process, 
the eLST and CST can become more synchronized, and when additional KOs are added to 
the system, requirement throughput increases, if only marginally for some types of 
requirements. Also, Chapter V demonstrated that there are additional increases in 
throughput and decreases in time for requirements to be delivered to the warfighter when 
both the CST is standardized and additional KOs are within the system. Last, Chapter V 
showed that the current Marine Corps eLST and III MEF OCS CST are not in alignment 
and that the warfighter is incapable of receiving requirements beyond the $10,000 threshold 
promptly. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This report presented an estimated Logistics Support Timeline and Contract 
Support Timeline (eLST-CST) model and proposed standardization of the current III MEF 
OCS process—with the TOC concept in mind—to optimize delivery costs in the form of 
time, reduce cycle-time of generated operational requirements above the micro-purchase 
threshold (MPT), improve requirements throughput, and provide process improvement 






The current III MEF organic support and non-organic support functions are 
out of alignment when it comes to delivering goods or services beyond the MPT to the 
warfighter at each MAGTF size—MEF, MEB, and MEU. Analysis of the outputs in 
Chapter IV revealed a significant misalignment between when an operational requirement 
would be available to meet warfighter needs and when the days of self-sustainment expired, 
which is the point at which their organic capability would need to be resupplied, or the unit 
would require non-organic support. In addition, even when a portion of the OCS process 
is standardized and removes a theoretical 60-day window from the current III MEF OCS 
process, there is still a misalignment between the two support timelines. 
Conclusion 2: 
Standardizing a portion of the current III MEF OCS process timeline takes 
steps towards synchronizing organic and non-organic warfighter support; however, 
only the MEB and MEF elements are likely to realize synchronization between 
organic and non-organic support before days of self-sustainment expire, with MEU 
elements likely to receive non-organic support within a week of days of self-
sustainment expiring. Analysis of the outputs showed that standardizing Marine Corps 
OCS requirements does decrease the time it takes to deliver operational requirements to 
the warfighter; however, the benefits from the standardization are only fully realized at the 
MEF and MEB level, which means there are additional steps necessary to further support 
non-organic operational requirements at the MEU level. 
Conclusion 3: 
A delay in OCS planning and execution has the greatest impact in prolonging 
delivery of requirements to the warfighter when the delay in OCS planning and 
execution exceeds 14 days (or 2 weeks). Analysis of the outputs revealed that any delay 
in OCS planning and execution increased the average wait time for warfighters looking to 
receive non-organic support. Interestingly, the data showed a delay of 0–1 days was 
optimal when it came to delaying the OCS process. One suggestion as to why the data 
indicates this is due to the necessity for contracting specialists to be present early on, 
directly involved, and continuously engaged in the operational planning process. Early on 
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involvement and engagement of contracting specialists would translate into a more refined 
requirement being delivered to contracting for fulfillment and would ultimately make the 
entire OCS process that much smoother. 
Conclusion 4: 
Adding additional KOs to the current III MEF OCS process increases 
throughput for operational requirements beyond the MPT; however, there are only 
marginal gains to throughput by going beyond two KOs working requirements 
simultaneously. The data showed that increasing the number of KOs to two KOs working 
operational requirements increased total requirements throughput; however, the data 
showed that any additional KO after that only marginally increased requirements 
throughput. 
Conclusion 5: 
The misalignment between organic and non-organic support timelines can be 
mitigated by increasing the number of KOs; however, synchronization between 
organic and non-organic support functions is still lacking, which suggests that the 
problem is process-related, or product related. Analysis of the data showed that the 
organic eLST and the non-organic CST are not in alignment with each other; therefore, it 
may be concluded that if non-organic support was required at the point when days of self-
sustainment was set to expire, it should not expect non-organic support to be available until 
sometime after. This waiting period extends for each level of the MAGTF submitting the 
requirement, starting with the longest delay being at the MEU level, and the shortest delay 
at the MEF level. The data showed that standardizing a portion of the OCS process 
decreases these wait times; however, they are only fully realized at the MEF and MEB 
level alone, and the MEU level still experienced up to a week delay in supplies or services 
being made available. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Specific recommendations to implement and realize increased efficiencies in the 
synchronization of current Marine Corps logistics support and III MEF OCS efforts are 
described in this section. The recommendations listed are not necessarily all-inclusive; 
however, they serve as a basis for taking further steps toward posturing a more lethal and 
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mutually supported warfighter. Depending on additional information or foreseeable 
conditions, the recommendations provided here are validated through this research. 
Recommendation 1: 
Standardize, to the maximum extent possible and with cost versus benefit in mind, 
as much of the current III MEF OCS process as possible. The purpose of this 
recommendation is to take steps toward synchronizing the organic support and non-organic 
support to the warfighter. As the operational environment becomes more complex, we can 
better serve the warfighter by simplifying and standardizing the machine that is intended 
to deliver goods or services to them at the point and time they need it most. Under the 
current process structure, we are doing the warfighter a potential disservice by not ensuring 
non-organic support (if operationally required) is not readily available at the point when 
their days of self-sustainment run dry and they are operationally incapable of an organic 
resupply. 
Recommendation 2: 
Incorporate KOs as soon as possible in the development of non-organic OCS 
requirements. The model showed that a delay in the contract support planning and 
execution phase led to decreased wait time to delivery of goods or services to the 
warfighter. Although the data does not explicitly state it is due to a greater degree of well-
defined, non-organic OCS requirements, it is likely the case considering a more refined 
package can be handled more efficiently and effectively, which means it can transition 
throughout the procurement process with less friction, delay, or disruption. 
Recommendation 3: 
Incorporate typical EABO scenarios, along with common logistics and non-organic 
OCS requirements, into Marine Corps KO formal education and formal training systems. 
This recommendation comes from the notion that educating and training additional KOs 
on common EABO mission types and corresponding logistics and non-organic OCS 
requirements better aligns education, training, and practice. Thus, it equips the future 
workforce to handle the rigorous demand of EABO-OCS requirements in the future. 
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D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
The primary research question is:  
Are the current III MEF Contract Support Timeline and an estimated Marine 
Corps Logistics Support Timeline synchronized to meet the demands of future force 
designs and Marine Corps planning guidance? This research report, through modeling 
and simulation, shows the current III MEF Contract Support Timeline and an estimated 
Marine Corps Logistics Support Timeline are not synchronized to meet the demands of 
future force designs and Marine Corps planning guidance. The model that was developed 
herein shows conclusively that through standardization and expedient initiation of the OCS 
process the two timelines can be more closely brought into alignment. 
The secondary research questions are addressed here:  
1. What estimated logistics support timeline elements facilitate or inhibit III 
MEF contracting support beyond the micro-purchase threshold? The 
elements of an estimated logistics support timeline are those elements related 
to time—planning and execution—and days of self-sustainment associated with 
each level of an MAGTF (MEF, MEB, or MEU). The model developed here 
concluded it was these elements that either facilitated or inhibited the III MEF 
contracting support timeline being able to provide necessary non-organic 
support at the point in time when days of self-sustainment were to expire. If the 
time to plan and execute a mission is truncated, the ability of a non-organic 
contracting support timeline is stressed to meet operational demand. 
Conversely, if the time to plan and execute a mission is extended, the ability of 
non-organic contracting support to meet operational demand is enhanced. 
2. What contract support timeline elements facilitate or inhibit III MEF 
contracting support beyond the micro-purchase threshold? The elements 
of a contract support timeline that facilitate or inhibit III MEF OCS is related 
to people, processes, and products. The model developed showed that the 
current III MEF OCS process is inhibited by the current OCS process in place. 
Moreover, the model showed the number of KOs within the system neither 
facilitated nor inhibited the time it took to fulfill requirements and get them to 
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the warfighter. Only when the current III MEF OCS process was standardized 
did the average wait time for goods or services to be delivered to the warfighter 
decrease. In addition, even with the addition of KOs, the capacity to fulfill 
requirements only grew substantially when there were two KOs at one time, 
and only marginally when the number of KOs in the system exceeded two. 
Essentially, the contract support timeline is inhibited by the contracting 
process itself and only slightly facilitated by the number of KOs working to 
fulfill operational requirements. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During research and analysis, the following areas were identified for further 
research that was outside the scope of this project: 
1. Explore a more robust estimated Logistics Support Timeline (eLST). The model 
developed in this research project took a very basic approach toward this aspect of 
supportability; wherein, in reality, the logistics support timeline is likely to be more robust 
and dynamic when it comes to ensuring the warfighter is provided the necessary support 
needed for the mission assigned. Further research in this area may prove beneficial in that 
there may be ways to increase organic supportability without inherently needing to contract 
out support, which will be of great concern as the Marine Corps postures itself for future 
operations. 
2. Develop a model that looks at the current Marine Corps OCS process from a 
“products” perspective to identify tools of contracting that are facilitating or inhibiting 
contracting support beyond the micro-purchase threshold, not just III MEF. Further 
research in this area may prove beneficial because the current contracting process may not 
need to be standardized if the appropriate contracting tools can be fielded. 
3. Explore mission-based scenarios using the model developed in this research 
report. The model herein was focused on operational requirements beyond the micro-
purchase threshold and did not consider the type and quantity of operational requirements 
typical of various Marine Corps missions. Further research in this area may prove 
beneficial in that it may contribute to a more effective and efficient standardized 
contracting support structure, which would help reduce average wait times for the delivery 
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of routine goods and services to the warfighter. To this end, a more comprehensive 
simulation model should be developed.  
4. Conduct a cost-benefit analysis of making the recommended changes provided 
within this research. Further research in this area may prove beneficial in that the 
recommended changes provided herein may be in reality too costly to implement when 
compared to the benefits to be gained. Only a cost-benefit analysis would provide the 
necessary insight before any real changes or steps to standardize the current Marine Corps 
OCS process should be taken. 
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